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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ISO 9000 is a set of international meta-standards that provide management 
requirements for creating and maintaining company quality systems.  Despite the 
prevalence of the standards, existing literature is sharply divided over whether ISO 9000 
is ultimately good or bad for companies (Anderson, Daly, & Johnson, 1999; Beirão & 
Sarsfield Cabral, 2002; Corbett, Montes-Sancho, & Kirsch, 2005; Docking & Dowen, 
1999; Hoyle, 1994; Huarng, Horng, & Chen, 1999; Huarng & Lee, 1995; Juran, 1995; 
Kanji, 1998; Lima, Resende, & Hasenclever, 2000; Martinez-Costa & Martinez-Lorente, 
2003; Nicolau & Sellers, 2002; Subba Rao, Ragu-Nathan, & Solis, 1997; Uzumeri, 
1997).  For firms that voluntarily pursue certification, a common method to justify initial 
costs is the potential to create significant economic value through quality improvement in 
accordance with a set of international quality assurance standards (Anderson, et al., 
1999).  However, even articles in the popular press have cast doubt on this claim and 
have offered evidence that ISO 9000 is not a guarantee of product quality or market value 
for the firm (Milbank, 1994).  Therefore, a question arises as to whether there is sufficient 
justification for a firm to pursue a program that carries with it no guarantee of external 
value despite often large up-front costs spent demonstrating to external auditors 
conformance to a set of minimum quality requirements.  This thesis will shed light on this 
critical issue by determining if an ISO 9000 certification announcement has an impact on 
the market value of a firm.  
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Despite the confusion over the value of ISO 9000, the standard has evolved over 
the past eighteen years from a means to harmonize disparate European regulatory bodies 
into a global meta-standard in almost 150 countries (International Organization of 
Standardization, 2003; Zuckerman, 1994).  Older versions of the standard actually 
delineated three separate quality certifications, ISO 9001, 9002, and 9003.  ISO 
9001:1994 was the most comprehensive of the three quality assurance models, ISO 
9002:1994 was an abbreviated model available only to firms engaged in production and 
installation activities, and ISO 9003:1994 was the least comprehensive and available only 
to firms engaged in testing and final inspection activities (Ragothaman & Korte, 1999).  
On December 15, 2000, a revised set of standards known as ISO 9001:2000 was 
officially released and combined the three 1994 standards into one (Cianfrani, Tsiakals, 
& West, 2001).  As ISO 9000 has spread worldwide, it has also become part of the global 
supply chain and is increasingly becoming a requirement for doing business particularly 
in Europe, where certification is a means of obtaining the CE Mark, a regulatory seal for 
products critical to public safety (Anderson, Daly, & Johnson, 1995).  In the United 
States, the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration all have adopted varying 
degrees of ISO 9000 as a supplier requirement (Anderson, et al., 1995).  Many firms have 
followed suit and demand that their suppliers become certified (Anderson, et al., 1999; 
Subba Rao, et al., 1997).   
ISO 9000 is widely disseminated, but certification is by no means an easy or 
routine process for most firms.  Implementation has been criticized as being time 
consuming and costly; collecting the documentation and completing the application very 
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often takes more than one year, and the required third-party audit may take several days 
to complete (Curkovic & Pagell, 1999).  Companies incur costs for auditors, training, and 
the associated lost time due to the training requirements and interviews by both internal 
and third party auditors (Arnold, 1994; Cianfrani, et al., 2001).  Because of the 
substantial required investment, the choice to implement ISO 9000 for many firms is not 
a decision to be taken lightly absent market or political pressures. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Criticism and Praise for ISO 9000 
Past literature has heaped both exuberant praise and harsh criticism upon the ISO 
9000 standards.  Perhaps the most common criticism of the standard is the extensive 
documentation often associated with its implementation and the potential for certification 
to become “consultant-driven paperwork” (Huarng, et al., 1999, p. 1024).  The 
certification process involves documenting the processes within a firm, and the risk of 
systemizing poor processes is often a concern (Australian Manufacturing Council, 1992).  
Furthermore, when a firm is pressured into attaining ISO 9000 registration, there is a 
possibility of short-term quality improvements for the certification process, but that 
performance could be the result of resource and effort loading that may be unsustainable.  
In such cases, certification is a “hollow achievement in the long run” (Terziovski, 
Samson, & Dow, 1997, p 4).  The potential for only short-term improvement prompted 
Hoyle (1994) to state that ISO 9000 is only a beginning step to an effective quality 
program.  Past empirical evidence suggests that ISO 9000 certified companies have a 
higher cost of quality and fewer new products than similar non-registered firms 
(Terziovski, et al., 1997).  Similarly, Uzumeri (1997) suggests that a meta-standard like 
ISO 9000 might actually slow innovation within a firm.   
Praise for ISO 9000 is rooted in some of the same parameters that also lead to its 
criticism.  Systemization as a means to reduce process variation in a firm is a potential 
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benefit of ISO 9000 certification (Huarng & Lee, 1995). Extensive documentation can 
actually be beneficial (Anderson, et al., 1995, Beattie & Sohal, 1999), as such 
information can provide managers with detailed information about the processes of the 
firm, leading to fact-based decision making rather than assumptions that can introduce 
stochastic system behavior and associated risk (Arnold, 1994).  While ISO 9000 is not a 
complete model of total quality management (TQM), the standard is compatible with 
TQM and can serve as a baseline for further quality initiatives (Arnold, 1994; Juran, 
1995; Kanji, 1998). 
 
Comparison of ISO 9000 and TQM 
During the evolution of ISO 9000 as a worldwide meta-standard, much of the 
associated literature has addressed the similarities and differences between the ISO 9000 
standards and the concepts of TQM.  While there has been some disagreement to the 
extent of correlation between the concepts, there are a few points of consensus.  ISO 
9000 is not the same as or a substitute for TQM, even though there are some shared 
characteristics (Subba Rao, et al., 1997).  ISO 9000 may best be described as either a 
subset or minimalist approach to TQM (Curkovic & Pagell, 1999; Hoyle, 1994; Kanji, 
1998).  Nicolau and Sellers (2002) state that certification is a guarantee of a minimum set 
of requirements, while Martinez-Costa and Martinez-Lorente (2003) describe registered 
firms as being in accordance with a generic norm.  Docking and Dowen (1999) state that 
obtaining an ISO certificate is like getting a regulatory seal of approval on a process, not 
a product.  Attaining certification may signal the achievement of meeting a specified 
standard, but the standard itself is not necessarily a signal of quality achievement. 
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Total quality management, on the other hand, emphasizes continuous 
improvement, not just meeting a baseline standard (Kanji, 1998).  The ultimate goal of 
the concepts of TQM is providing an added economic value through what Deming (1986) 
calls “delighting the customer.”  TQM is associated with customer satisfaction, 
continuous improvement, fact-based decision-making, and people-centered management 
for the purposes of business excellence, not business standardization (Kanji, 1998).  
There is no single definition of total quality management, just as there is no one 
definition of quality because it is highly non-quantitative and changes over the course of 
time and business enterprise (Tobin, 1990).  Many researchers have attempted to 
operationalize the construct of TQM, and a complete discussion of this body of work is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  A few typical examples are included here for descriptive 
purposes.  Samson and Terziovski (1999) provide a list of several key components of 
TQM: leadership, management of people, customer focus, use of information and 
analysis, process improvement, and strategic and quality learning.  Easton and Jarrell 
(1998), in their study of the effects of TQM on business performance, identify key 
characteristics based on the criteria of the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award.  
Similarly, Hendricks and Singhal (1996, 1997b, 2001a, 2001b) use the winning of a 
quality award, whether from an independent source like the Baldrige or supplier awards, 
as a proxy for TQM implementation.  Regardless of the constructs used to describe TQM, 
it is widely agreed the successful TQM implementation is associated with above average 
quality achievement.   
Despite the disparate views in the literature between ISO 9000 and TQM, they are 
somewhat correlated and are not completely separate constructs.  ISO 9000 may be 
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viewed as a first step of quality usually associated with accordance to technical 
specifications (Crosby, 1979), while TQM is a more robust and developed customer 
oriented approach (Deming, 1986).  ISO 9000 certification can be used as a foundation 
for further quality improvement (Kanji, 1998).  Even quality guru Joseph Juran (1995) 
does not dismiss ISO 9000 certification but states that firms must go beyond the 
minimum standard in order to be highly effective.  However, a survey of 700 firms in a 
broad range of industries during that same year shows that only 7% see ISO 9000 as part 
of an overall TQM strategy (Taylor, 1995).   
An alternative view consists of determining the difference between an order-
winner and an order-qualifier (Hill, 1993).  Hill states that qualifiers are the set of criteria 
that a firm must meet in order to be considered in the marketplace.  Order-winners are 
those criteria that actually win orders or generate sales.  Qualifiers are the set of 
minimum requirements that allow a firm to compete but do not guarantee market success, 
and order-winners are the separate criteria that determine success.  Using an analogy 
from the sports world, the order-qualifiers for a hockey team would be the presence of 6 
players, padding, and sticks.  The order-winners would be teamwork, good 
communication and most importantly, the ability to score goals.  In the realm of quality 
management, ISO 9000 certification would be an order-qualifier for effective quality, 
particularly in industry sectors with tight regulatory requirements.  Being ISO 9000 
certified allows a firm to compete within the market, but it is no guarantee of market 
success.  The order-winners in this situation might be outstanding performance quality or 
delighting the customer, which do not guarantee but contribute greatly to added economic 
value and market success.  Qualifiers are not necessarily less important than winners, but 
 8  
they are fundamentally different.  To offer qualifiers, a firm must only be as good as its 
competitors, but to offer winners, it must be better than the competition (Hill, 1993). 
 
Financial Impact of TQM and ISO 9000 
A few researchers have empirically observed the effects of total quality 
management on the financial performance of a firm.  Using the winning of a quality 
award as a proxy for TQM implementation, Hendricks and Singhal (1996, 1997b, 2001a) 
published a series of studies that use the event study methodology to determine the 
impact of winning that award.  In the short term around the announcement of winning an 
award, firms experience an abnormal increase in stock prices of about 0.6% and more 
pronounced reactions for smaller firms or firms that won awards from independent 
organizations like the Baldrige (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  For long-term stock prices, 
award winning firms outperform a control group by about 40% in the five years 
following the award.  In a ten year period ranging from six years before to three years 
after winning an award, award-wining firms have significantly higher operating income, 
sales growth, capital expenditures, asset growth, and employment growth than a control 
group (Hendricks & Singhal, 1997b).  Smaller firms, more diversified companies, less 
capital intensive firms, and independent award winners exhibit higher changes in 
operating income (Hendricks & Singhal, 2001a).  Instead of using quality awards, Easton 
and Jarrell (1998) developed a survey to identify firms that have implemented TQM and 
verified their findings with follow-up interviews.  They report similar results of TQM 
firms outperforming a control group on both accounting variables and excess stock 
returns.  Higher degrees of out performance were observed for more mature TQM 
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programs and manufacturing firms.  Samson and Terziovski (1999) also used a carefully 
developed TQM construct and report that leadership, management of people, and 
customer focus are the strongest significant predictors of operational performance in 
1200 Australian and New Zealand manufacturing organizations. 
However, empirical observations on the financial impact of ISO 9000 certification 
have yielded inconsistent results.  Past researchers have researched the impact of ISO 
9000 registration on both stock price and accounting variables.  With regard to 
accounting metrics, Corbett, et al. (2005) report that three years after certification, ISO 
9000 registered firms exhibit a significant increase in return on assets, return on sales, 
intangible assets, sales growth, and the sales to assets ratio.  Simmons and White (1999) 
observed a sample of 63 certified electronics companies and report higher profitability 
versus a non-certified control group but no significant difference in the sales to equity 
ratio.  On the other hand, Lima, et al. (2000) using a similar methodology as Easton and 
Jarrell (1998) to determine the effects of ISO 9000 registration on both financial and 
stock price parameters, observed a significantly higher sales to assets ratio in their sample 
of 129 certified Brazilian firms.  A caution with these results is that research that tests the 
impact of ISO 9000 certification on only accounting variables may be affected by the fact 
that accounting procedures are not uniform among all companies and are determined by 
each individual firm’s financial officers (Benston, 1982; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
Depending on each firm’s accounting management techniques or on the relative extent of 
over-reporting earnings between certified and comparable firms, a conservative bias may 
be introduced into the results.  It is important, then, to determine if improvements in the 
internal measures of production economics correspond to improvements in external 
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measures of firm performance, including shareholder value, that are more universal in 
nature. 
Other empirical studies on the external financial effects of ISO 9000 registration 
have taken the form of event studies measuring the degree of abnormal stock price 
returns.  Anderson, et al. (1995) found no significant positive wealth effect on the stock 
price of a sample of 221 American firms during a short term period centered on when the 
company’s registration became official, while Docking and Dowen (1999), using a 
sample of 252 American firms who had achieved their first certificate observed 
significant positive abnormal stock prices only for smaller firms.  Several smaller 
international studies with limited sample sizes also report conflicting results.  In a sample 
of 30 Spanish companies, the stock market exhibited no abnormal reaction to the official 
ISO 9000 registration date (Martinez-Costa & Martinez-Lorente, 2003).  However, 
whenever a Spanish firm publicly announced that it had received a quality certification 
based on ISO 90001, the market reaction was positive and significant (Nicolau & Sellers, 
2002).  Similarly, Beirão and Sarsfield Cabral (2002) report that for a sample of 13 
Portuguese companies, the market favorably anticipates ISO 9000 certification 
announcements by 4 trading days.   
Past TQM studies have observed firms that have shown above normal 
performance as judged by independent award criteria (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; 
Hendricks & Singhal, 1997b; Hendricks & Singhal, 2001a), exceptional supply 
capabilities as evidenced by supplier awards (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 1997b; Hendricks & Singhal, 2001a), or high TQM performance based upon 
                                                 
1  Previously mentioned studies observed the market reaction during the official registration date.  
Subsequent studies mentioned in this chapter observe the reaction to a public news announcement, which 
is not necessarily concurrent with the official registration.  For further details, see Chapter V. 
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rigorously developed academic constructs (Easton & Jarrell, 1998; Samson & Terziovski, 
1999), but the market may perceive attainment of a minimum certification like ISO 9000, 
for which there is no guarantee of exceptional quality, quite differently.  Overall, the 
existing literature is sharply divided over the overall effectiveness of ISO 9000.  In 
particular, the economic impact of this global meta-standard is largely unknown with 
previous empirical analyses yielding inconclusive or conflicting results, largely due to 
structural or sample size limitations.  Because of the continued debate over the 
correlation between ISO 9000 and the concepts of TQM, doubt remains as to whether the 
financial impact of each of these management approaches may be similar. Hence, there is 
a need for this study to provide a more rigorous and systematic approach then previous 
empirical studies in this area to clarify this issue. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Market Expectations 
The extent of the stock market’s reaction to the attainment of an ISO 9000 
certificate depends on the degree of change of the market’s expectation of quality from 
the firm.  Becoming ISO 9000 registered contains information about the quality processes 
at a particular site within a firm and confirms that, in the eyes of a third party observer, 
that firm’s site has met a set of minimum requirements.  Prior to registration, the market 
has developed a preconceived idea of the effectiveness of the firm’s quality processes.  
Let P1 be this initial assessment of the probability of an effective quality program, which 
is a function of many parameters, including the firm’s reputation, size, industry, and the 
likelihood of attaining a quality certification like ISO 9000.  This probability, particularly 
the reputation and likelihood of certification components, is formulated by signals such 
as newswire announcements pertaining to quality, quality initiatives in annual reports or 
government financial disclosures, or management emphasis on quality in shareholder or 
supplier meetings (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; Spence, 1973).  For the most part, these 
signals are self-reported and are difficult to verify by an impartial or external observer.  
After a firm announces ISO 9000 certification, the market incorporates this new 
information and reevaluates quality reputation of the firm and the effectiveness of the 
firm’s quality programs.  Let P2 be this reassessed value for the probability that the firm 
has developed a set of effective quality processes.  The market will continue to reassess 
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the effectiveness of the firm’s quality program long after the ISO 9000 announcement as 
more information becomes available, such as further management discussions on quality 
or additional evidence of product quality (Garvin, 1991).  Therefore, P2 does not remain 
constant after registration.   
In the short window centered on when the certification becomes known, the 
market reacts to the news that a site within a firm has been judged acceptable against a 
baseline standard.  The change in probabilities is the result of a signal to the market and is 
expressed as P2 – P1 (Spence, 1973).  There are several parameters that affect both the 
sign and the magnitude of this expression.  A high initial quality reputation could result in 
a P1 very close to 1, limiting the signaling potential of ISO 9000 certification and 
constraining the potential magnitude of the reaction.  Prior anticipation of certification 
may affect the reaction in a similar manner, limiting the “surprise factor” and weakening 
certification’s signaling potential.  Subba Rao, et al. (1997) shed some light on this issue: 
based on an international survey of managers, the internal perceived benefits of ISO 9000 
occur only after registration.  They report no significant differences in the perceptions in 
managers of firms planning to become certified and firms with no certification plans, but 
significant perception differences between firms planning to become certified and 
registered firms.  I am primarily concerned with the reaction to the attainment of the ISO 
9000 meta-standard, and, as any reaction is likely to be positive, I assume P2 – P1 > 0.   
 
Economic Value of Quality 
Let V be the value of the future cash flows of the firm generated by an effective 
quality program (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  This quantity can be divided into two 
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parts: conformance quality and performance quality.  Let Vc be the value in implementing 
processes that improve conformance quality within a firm.  Conformance quality is based 
upon Crosby’s (1979) perception of quality as the degree of accordance of a product’s 
design, manufacturing, or operational performance to a predetermined norm.  Let Vp be 
the value in implementing processes that improve performance quality within a firm.  
Performance quality is based upon Deming’s (1982) perception of quality in terms of 
operating parameters that lead to customer satisfaction.  Therefore, V = Vc + Vp, and the 
sign and magnitude of V are dependent upon the signs and relative magnitudes of both Vc 
and Vp.   
 
Conformance Quality 
Within a particular product market, if different firms offer similar products at 
similar prices, the product with the highest conformance quality is likely to garner the 
greatest market share.  It has been empirically verified that conformance quality and 
market share are positively correlated (Buzzell & Wiersema, 1981; Craig & Douglas, 
1982; Phillips, Chang, & Buzzell, 1983).  If one firm within a particular market has 
higher product conformance quality than its competitors, customers may be willing to 
pay a premium for the perception of added value (Viscusi, 1978).  Thus, by maintaining 
the same market share, a firm with higher conformance quality could increase its 
revenues.  Both situations suggest a positive correlation between conformance quality 
and revenue. 
While the relation between conformance quality and revenue is relatively 
straightforward, there is disagreement over the effects of conformance quality on costs.  
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Juran and Gryna (1980) develop the concept of an ideal or optimal conformance level.  
Added preventative costs are used to offset the costs of failure up to a certain level of 
diminishing returns at which the preventative costs associated with improved 
conformance quality cannot be recouped by future reductions in the costs of failure.  
Empirical evidence supporting this concept of an optimal performance level includes 
Terziovski, et al.’s (1997) study reporting that ISO 9000 registered firms exhibited a 
higher cost of quality than non-registered firms.  Conversely, other theories suggest that 
there is no point of diminishing returns and that the optimal level of conformance quality 
is zero defects (Crosby, 1979; Deming, 1982).  No matter how much preventative costs 
must be spent to further improve conformance quality, they can still be recouped by later 
savings in reduced cost of failures.  This theory is supported by empirical evidence that 
suggests that on average, R&D accounts for 12% of a project’s costs, acquisition 
accounts for 28%, and operations and support account for 60% (Kerzner, 2003).  Small 
increases in R&D costs for conformance quality improvement can result in huge savings 
during operations and support, when the cost of failure is realized.  Despite the 
controversy over the optimal level of conformance, ISO 9000 is a management control 
system that has a strong potential to improve conformance quality and reduce quality 
costs (Anderson, et al., 1995).  Conformance quality is associated with lower cost of 
quality and higher revenues, both of which lead to a positive Vc. 
 
Performance Quality 
The relation between improved performance quality and value creation is much 
more ambiguous than the relation between conformance quality and future expected cash 
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flows.  Increases in performance quality are associated with direct increases in costs 
(Gale & Branch, 1982; Phillips, et al., 1983).  The relation is particularly strong for 
differentiated product markets where quality is judged more in terms of performance 
rather than conformance.  However, the effect of improved performance quality on 
revenues is unclear.  While the market may accept higher prices for high performing 
goods (Viscusi, 1978), there is no strong evidence to suggest whether firm market share 
will change.   
Higher performance quality leads to an increase in costs and might lead to an 
increase in revenues depending on the relative change in market share for a higher priced 
good, making it difficult to predict the sign of Vp.  Despite the ambiguity, it is widely 
accepted that ISO 9000 is a better measure of conformance quality than performance 
quality (Anderson, et al., 1999).  Even though it is difficult to predict the sign of Vp, 
because the benefits of ISO 9000 are more likely related to conformance than 
performance, the magnitude of Vp is very low compared to Vc (|Vp| << |Vc|).  The sign and 
magnitude of V are dominated by Vc; therefore, if Vc > 0, then V > 0.  
 
Market Reaction to Certification 
 The overall change in the firm’s market value due to the attainment of ISO 9000 
certification is (P2 – P1)V.  This quantity is the reaction to the attainment of the standard, 
not the overall economic value of an effective quality program.  Some of the value of the 
quality program will be incorporated prior to the event depending on the initial 
effectiveness of the program or the firm’s existing quality certifications, and some of the 
value is incorporated after the certification announcement as more evidence concerning 
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the firm’s product quality becomes available.  Thus, the quantity (P2 – P1)V is a lower 
bound on the overall market reaction (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  The overall direction 
of the change in market value due to the certification announcement is therefore 
dependent upon the signs of V and P2 – P1, and the strength of the reaction is dependent 
upon their relative magnitudes.  The predicted signs of P2 – P1 and V have been discussed 
previously; therefore, the market reaction to an announcement of ISO 9000 is predicted to 
be positive, leading to the first hypothesis: 
H1. Firms announcing ISO 9000 certification experience an increase in their 
market value. 
 
Risk and Asymmetric Information 
The stock price of a firm is a reflection of the net present values of future 
expected cash flows.  Quality is but one factor that could affect this value, but judgments 
about the quality capabilities of a firm are largely dependent upon internal processes that 
are extremely difficult to observe (Toffel, 2005).  Investors must rely on scant or biased 
information on which to base their assessments of the firm.  Claims of implementing 
TQM principles or other quality initiatives are very prevalent, but their scope and 
accuracy are very difficult if not impossible to verify (Akerlof, 1970; Anderson, et al., 
1995; Nicolau & Sellers, 2002).  As a result, an asymmetry of information develops 
concerning the quality processes within a firm even though such additional information 
could aid investors in their assessments of the company, leading to a change in the 
variance of the firm’s stock returns and a change in its firm-specific, or idiosyncratic, risk 
(Hui, Leung, & Huang, 1993).  Idiosyncratic risk is the element of risk that is attributable 
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to specifics of the particular firm after controlling for the risk of the overall market 
(Black & Scholes, 1973).  While a construct of performance characteristics like those in 
the SCOR2 model could aid investors, such information can be ambiguous or non-
existent (Supply Chain Council, 2005; Wang, Huang, & Dismukes, 2004).   
ISO 9000 certification is a formal, external signal of process quality control and 
contains information that the firm’s internal processes conform to a specified standard.  
As such, ISO 9000 has the potential to reduce asymmetric information within the market, 
leading to a change in the idiosyncratic risk of a firm (Goetzmann & Massa, 2005; Kraus 
& Smith, 1989; Spence, 1973; Toffel, 2005).  The direction of change is dependent upon 
how the market perceives adherence to a set of minimum requirements.  If the market is 
convinced that ISO 9000 has the potential to improve quality within the firm, and that 
quality improvement will improve the firm’s standing relative to other firms that face 
similar market risks, the idiosyncratic risk of that firm may decrease to reflect the 
perceived improvement in the firm’s competitive position compared to the general 
market.  However, attaining ISO 9000 certification may also impact the business risk of a 
firm (variance on the rate of return on assets), possibly signaling wealth transfers between 
bondholders and equityholders (Black & Scholes, 1973).  There still may be a high 
degree of uncertainty of how the firm’s internal processes actually affect quality, 
particularly as measured by performance characteristics, and theoretical and empirical 
work on the relation between quality and risk is rather limited (Hendricks & Singhal, 
1996).  Because of this limitation of the information content of ISO 9000 registration, a 
two-tailed hypothesis is more appropriate. 
                                                 
2 Supply Chain Operations Reference 
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H2.  Announcing ISO 9000 certification is associated with a change in 
idiosyncratic risk. 
 
Effects of Moderating Variables 
 Hypothesis H1 concerns the overall market reaction to certification 
announcements.  There may also be factors that moderate the strength of the reaction.  
These contingencies are worth evaluating because it is of great importance whether the 
theories relating conformance and performance quality to business performance are 
universal in nature or are dependent on additional factors.  Specifically, there may be 
extenuating factors that affect the appropriateness of ISO 9000 as a meta-standard that 
has value creating potential within a firm.  I empirically evaluate two of those potential 
factors: firm size and standard stringency. 
 
Effect of Firm Size 
Firm size has the potential to affect the extent of the market’s reaction to ISO 
9000 certification.  The processes of large firms may be more resistant to change due to 
the presence of a significant management bureaucracy (Daft, 1995, Hendricks & Singhal, 
2001a).  This management inertia could result in less change between P2 and P1 for larger 
firms, thus moderating the extent of the market’s reaction to certification.  Additionally, 
large firms are more likely to have multiple sites that could potentially become ISO 9000 
registered.  Since the certification is usually site specific, the effects associated with the 
certification announcement may be diluted in large firms.  Smaller firms may have more 
to gain in terms of reputation than larger firms, leading to a stronger signaling 
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component.  Large firms also tend to get more media analyst coverage, so the market 
may have a better idea of the quality practices of large firms than of smaller ones.  Thus, 
announcing certification may be less of a surprise for larger firms because most of the 
effects of implementing a quality program may have already been incorporated by the 
market.  These factors suggest that |P2 – P1| may be negatively correlated with firm size, 
which has been empirically verified by past event studies (Docking & Dowen, 1999; 
Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  The potential of firm size as a moderating variable leads to 
the third hypothesis: 
H3.  The market reaction to ISO 9000 certification announcements is more 
positive for small firms than for large firms. 
 
Effect of Standard Stringency 
Past empirical evidence has suggested that more stringent quality awards, such as 
independent awards like the Baldrige, have a greater impact the market value of a firm 
than supplier quality awards (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996). Interestingly, I have identified 
a dearth of literature concerning the economic impact of the ISO 9000:2000 standard, 
which was released in late 2000 and officially replaced the older 1994 series of standards 
on December 15, 2003 (ISO, 2003). The introduction of the ISO 9000:2000 series of 
standards has addressed some of the concerns levied by commentators like Juran (1995).  
The new standard has fewer requirements for documented procedures than the 1994 
standards, potentially reducing the cost of quality and increasing the value of 
conformance quality Vc (Cianfrani, et al., 2001).  The 2000 series of standards has a 
renewed emphasis on customer focus and continuous improvement, both of which are 
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more aligned with the concepts of TQM rather than conformance to a minimum standard 
(Cianfrani, et al., 2001, Terziovski, Power, & Sohal, 2003).  The new standard may be 
more closely associated with creating economic value through performance quality Vp.  
Furthermore, by eliminating ISO 9002 and 9003, which were subsections of the ISO 
9001:1994 standard, companies no longer can opt for a lower minimum requirement out 
of fear of failing to achieve certification.  The market could potentially view ISO 
9001:2000 as more stringent and thus in a more favorable light than ISO 9001:1994, ISO 
9002:1994, and ISO 9003:19943.  These changes lead to Hypothesis 4: 
H4.  The market reaction to ISO 9000:2000 announcements is more positive than 
the reaction to ISO 9000:1994 announcements. 
                                                 
3  ISO 9001:1994 is viewed as more stringent than both ISO 9002:1994 and ISO 9003:1994 (Anderson, et 
al., 1995; Ragothaman & Korte, 1999), but all three standards have been superseded by ISO 9001:2000.  
It is of little practical or management implication if there is any difference among the three 1994 
standards since those certificates are no longer valid. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION PROCEDURE AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
I identified a sample of firms that had announced ISO 9000 series certification by 
searching full-text articles in the following databases: Business Wire, Dow Jones 
Business News, Dow Jones News Service, PR News, PR Newswire, Reuters News, and 
the Wall Street Journal.  The search was conducted in February and March 2005 and 
covered the time period from 1999 to 2002.  These years were purposefully chosen to 
ensure an adequate sample of firms who announced certification to the 1994 series of 
standards and to the 2000 series of standards.  Keywords in the search were “ISO” and 
“certification.”  2421 articles contained this combination of keywords.  I read each of the 
articles and used the criteria listed in Appendix A to eliminate announcements (Docking 
& Dowen, 1999; Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; Hendricks & Singhal, 1997a; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 2003; Hendricks, Singhal, & Wiedman, 1995; Nicolau & Sellers, 2002). 
The number of announcements eliminated by each criterion is presented in Table 
1.  Some announcements were eliminated by more than one criterion.  If the 
announcement failed by criteria 1 through 5, no further information about the 
announcement was collected.  2136 announcements were eliminated by these five 
criteria, leaving 285 announcements in the preliminary sample.  For each event in the 
preliminary sample, the following data were collected for classification:  
• Company name 
• 3 or 4 digit SIC code for the primary industry 
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• Announcement date 
• Source for the announcement 
• A description of the announcement, including the division or facility name  
• Whether the certification was the first in the company, a renewal of an existing 
certificate, a certificate for a new site in a company that had achieved certification 
at other sites, or an upgrade from the 1994 series of standards to ISO 9001:2000 
• Whether the certification was ISO 9001:1994, 9002:1994, 9003:1994, or 
9001:2000. 
 
Table 1. The Final Sample 
 
Elimination Criterion Announcements 
Eliminated  
1. No Certificate Awarded 
2. Problem Pinpointing Event Date 
3. Not Traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX 
4. Concurrent with Earnings Reports 
2136 
5. September 11 Terrorist Attacks  31 
6. Insufficient Stock Information 28 
7. Repeat Announcements 6 
8. Articles in WSJ* 0 
9. Insufficient Financial Data 24 
10. Plans to Become Certified 9 
11. Prior to Official Registration 7 
12. After Publication in QSU Database 3 
13. Unknown Classification 1 
14. No Control Firm 7 
 
*Three announcements in the sample mentioned other perhaps significant 
events at the same time as the ISO 9000 certification announcement.  On 
April 7, 1999, the DII Group mentions a new large contract at the same time 
their Czech facility obtained ISO 9002 registration; on April 20, 1999, Thor 
Industries mentioned a new contract at the same time their Salina, KS 
facility was registered to ISO 9001:1994; and on November 7, 2000, MSC 
Software Corporation mentioned a new product at the same time they were 
ISO 9001:1994 registered.  These announcements were included in the final 
sample because there was no other mention of any of them in another 
widely available public source, and they were judged not to be significant 
enough to warrant elimination from the sample. 
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After eliminating announcements where the above data were not available, the 
final sample consisted of 204 announcements.  112 announcements were made prior to 
the release of the ISO 9000:2000 series, but firms still announced certification to the 
1994 series of standards for several months afterwards.  99 announcements were for ISO 
9001:1994 certifications, 57 were for ISO 9002:1994 certifications, and 50 were for ISO 
9001:2000 certifications.  One announcement pertained to both a 9001:1994 and a 
9002:1994 certification, and one announcement pertained to both a 9002:1994 and a 
9001:2000 certification.  I found no announcements for ISO 9003:1994 certifications.  33 
announcements pertained to first time certifications within a company, 18 pertained to 
renewals of existing certifications, 10 pertained to upgrades from the 1994 series of 
standards to the 2000 series of standards, and 71 pertained to new facility certifications 
for firms that had previously certified other sites.  Two announcements mentioned 
multiple certifications, and information about the certification history of the firm was not 
available for 74 of the announcements.   
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics about the final sample.  Panel A provides 
descriptive financial data taken from the fiscal year prior to the announcement.  Four 
different measures of firm size (number of employees, total sales, total assets, and market 
value) are provided.  Firms in the sample range from those with a few employees, less 
than $1 million in sales, less than $3 million in assets, and $1000 in total equity to those 
with over 300000 employees, over $100 billion in sales, over $700 billion in assets, and 
over $50 billion in total equity.  Three measures of firm leverage (total debt, debt to 
equity ratio, and debt to asset ratio) are also included.  One firm in the sample has no 
corporate debt, and the most levered firm has a total debt of over $600 billion.  Slightly 
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more than half of the companies turned a profit in the fiscal year preceding the 
announcement.  The highest profit reported is over $12 billion, while one company 
reported a loss of over $4 billion.  Panel B provides an industry breakdown based on the 
primary SIC code of the firm.  While the majority of the firms are manufacturers, the 
sample covers a wide range of industries.  However, the sample does not contain any 
agricultural, mining, fishing, or public administration firms.  The largest firms in terms of 
both total assets and market value are those in the financial services sector and include 
Citibank, Banc of America, AIG, and others.  The smallest firms in the sample are 
medical devices manufacturers including Medstone International, Paradigm Medical 
Industries, and others.   
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on the 204 Announcements of Firms Attaining ISO 
9000 Registration 
 
Panel A. Financial Data 
 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Total Sales (Million $) 5517.3 175.4 16618.0 128051.1 0.381 
Total Assets (Million $) 24353.4 224.5 114371.6 700697.9 2.966 
Total Debt (Million $) 21715.6 78.1 105745.6 625137.3 0.000 
Market Value (Million $) 2742.6 124.0 9406.0 54135.3 0.001 
Net Income (Loss) (Million $) 366.9 3.576 1518.5 12735 (4118.0) 
Employees 20970 990 56236 323000 6 
Debt/Equity Ratio 1.509 0.886 2.870 14.222 0.000 
Debt Ratio 
a
 0.471 0.483 0.247 1.311 0.042 
a The debt ratio is defined as the total debt divided by the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. 
 
      
Table 2. Descriptive statistics on the 204 announcements of firms attaining ISO 9000 registration (continued) 
 
Panel B. Industry Breakdown 
b 
 
 
b No announcements were found for SIC Codes 0110-1799, and 9111-9999. 
 
Division SIC Codes Description Announcements 
Mean Assets 
(Million $) 
Mean Market 
Value (Million $) 
2010-3999 Manufacturing 138 5527.4 1149.2 
2010-2999 Food, Furniture, Paper, and Chemicals 10 1331.2 535.4 
3010-3569 Rubber, Leather, Stone, Industrial Machinery 23 1857.1 963.4 
3570-3699 Computers, Electronics, and Communication 66 7885.1 1141.4 
3710-3799 Transportation Equipment 9 18250.6 5251.9 
D 
3810-3999 Instrumentation and Medical Devices 30 736.4 282.7 
E 4011-4971 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, 
Gas, and Sanitary Services 
16 8891.7 2597.9 
F 5012-5199 Wholesale Trade 12 1780.4 490.5 
G 5211-5999 Retail Trade 2 21509.4 4340.4 
H 6011-6799 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 8 483770.3 35486.5 
I 7011-8999 Services 28 4588.7 2173.8 
2
6
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CHAPTER V 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Overview 
I used the event study methodology to measure the shareholder’s financial impact 
associated with the announcement of ISO 9000 certification.  This approach is used to 
determine the effects of a particular event and isolate them from general market behavior 
(Brown & Warner, 1980; Brown & Warner, 1985).  Any price change has two 
components: market- or industry-wide movements, and firm-specific or unique 
movements traceable to the content of the event, or in this case, the certification 
announcement.  The firm-specific component is an adjusted return usually referred to as 
an “abnormal return” and is an estimate of the percent change in the stock price 
associated with that particular event.  If a set of firms experience similar events, such as 
achieving ISO 9000 certification, then it is possible to calculate the average abnormal 
return on an event date for the entire set.  Statistical tests can then be employed to 
determine the significance of any change or valuation impact of that type of event.   
A major assumption associated with the event study methodology is that the 
market is efficient and can react to the information content of a certification 
announcement over a relatively short period of time (Brown & Warner, 1985; 
McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  Therefore, the study is strengthened if the event period or 
window is as small as possible and centered on the event (Barclay & Litzenberger, 1988; 
Brown & Warner, 1980; Dyckman, Philbrick, & Jens, 1984; McWilliams & Siegel, 
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1997).  The possibility of abnormal returns being affected by an extenuating factor, such 
as dividend announcements, new products, or the signing of a new contract, is diminished 
because fewer contaminating events are likely to be present in a shorter event window 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  In addition, the power of any statistical tests that are 
employed is increased regardless of the statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  These factors reduce the likelihood of Type I and II errors.   
 
Event Date Specification 
When dealing with events such as ISO 9000 certification, problems can arise 
when attempting to pinpoint the event date.  Past studies have set the event date as the 
day the company’s certification registration becomes official (Anderson, et al., 1995; 
Anderson, et al., 1999; Docking & Dowen, 1999; Martinez-Costa & Martinez-Lorente, 
2003).  The problem with this method is that investors may not be aware that the firm has 
achieved certification as soon as the registration becomes official.  Since there is no real-
time ISO 9000 registration database, in some instances the first time an investor may hear 
that a particular firm has been registered is when the next quarterly update to the ISO 
9000 database becomes available, as many as 60 trading days.  Specifying a 60-day event 
period dramatically weakens the effectiveness of the event study methodology.  Instead, I 
use the date of first public announcement of official certification. 
Despite the methodological advantages over the alternatives, specifying the event 
date as the day of the public announcement across the news wires is not perfect and 
requires a few controls to increase effectiveness.  The company may announce that the 
firm has passed their final certification audit and has been recommended for certification, 
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even though it is illegal for a firm to state that it has achieved certification or is registered 
until the certification registration becomes official.  Seven firms in the preliminary 
sample fit this criterion, and to avoid confusion and possible event date misspecification, 
they were removed from the final sample (Appendix A, criterion 11).  There is also the 
possibility that the firm may wait to make an official announcement for a variety of 
reasons, including but not limited to: gathering information and approvals for the official 
press release or including the news as part of a larger announcement.  If the wait is 
sufficiently long, the news may go public first by another means, such as company leaks 
or an appearance in the ISO 9000 registered company database.  Three firms in the 
preliminary sample fit this criterion, and to avoid confusion and possible event date 
misspecification, they were removed from the final sample (Appendix A, criterion 12).   
If an announcement contains no new information, then there will be no significant 
abnormal return because the news has already been incorporated into the price of the 
stock (MacKinlay, 1997).  Therefore, if news of an ISO 9000 certification has been 
leaked to the market, there is the possibility that the stock price will change prior to an 
event window centered on the announcement of official certification.  If it is known when 
the market first became aware of the certification, partial anticipation estimation models 
such as the one developed by Malatesta & Thompson (1985) can be used to isolate the 
effects of the leak.  However, such information is difficult to obtain, so I attempted to 
control for the effects of news leaks within each of the firms in the sample.  Any 
announcement containing information to the extent that the firm was pursuing 
certification was eliminated from the sample, along with subsequent announcements 
pertaining to that particular certification effort.  Nine firms in the preliminary sample fit 
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this criterion, and to limit the effects of news leaks, they were removed from the final 
sample (Appendix A, criterion 10).   
Considering the circumstances surrounding ISO 9000 certification 
announcements and the need to limit the effects of news leaks, I determined the exact 
event date by the time and date of the first public certification announcement by the 
newswires (Beirão & Sarsfield Cabral, 2002; Hendricks & Singhal, 1996; Hendricks & 
Singhal, 1997a; Hendricks & Singhal, 2003; Hendricks, et al., 1995; Nicolau & Sellers, 
2002).  If the announcement or newswire release was before the closing bell of the three 
major American stock markets (16:00 Eastern time), the event day is the same calendar 
day as the announcement date (197 announcements).  If the announcement was made 
after the closing bell or on a day that the markets were closed, then the event day was 
specified as the next trading day after the calendar date of the announcement (7 
announcements).  While it is possible for investors to react to late afternoon and evening 
events due to after-hours trading, the method the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) uses to calculate stock returns is based upon the closing price of the equity.  
Therefore, the valuation impact of the announcement is not captured until the returns of 
the following trading day are posted. 
Calendar time was translated into a relative event time using the following 
procedure.  The day of the certification event day is set at Day 0.  The trading day after 
the event day is denoted Day +1, the subsequent trading day as Day +2, and so on.  The 
trading day before the event day is denoted Day -1, the preceding trading day as Day -2, 
and so on.  Weekends, holidays, and other days on which the market is closed are 
ignored.  Because there is still the possibility of event date misspecification, I also 
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analyze the abnormal returns on Day -1 and Day +1 in addition to the event day (Day 0).  
If information is leaked prematurely, there may be an impact on Day -1.  If the 
announcement is very late in the trading day (around 15:45), the full extent of the 
announcement may not be captured until Day +1.  Even though there is some debate 
within the literature as to how quickly the market captures new information under the 
efficient market hypothesis (Dann, Myers, & Raab, 1977; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; 
Mitchell & Netter, 1989), the overwhelming majority of the reaction should be captured 
between Day -1 and Day +1.   
 
Calculating Abnormal Returns 
Initially, three different commonly used models: the “Market Model,” the “Mean 
Adjusted Returns Model,” and the “Market Adjusted Returns Model,” were used to 
estimate abnormal returns (Brown & Warner, 1985; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  Later, 
in order to control for firm size and industry effects, two additional models were 
employed, the “Size and Industry Adjusted Returns Model” and the “Size and Industry 
Adjusted Market Model.”  Empirical studies have shown these two parameters could 
impact the magnitude of abnormal returns (Banz, 1981; Barber & Lyon, 1996; Fama & 
French, 1993; Reinganum, 1981).   
The event study methodology consists of isolating abnormal returns from total 
returns, so a method is needed to estimate the expected return on a particular day.  An 
estimation period (EstP) of 200 days was used in this study for statistical soundness and 
to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous data (Scholes & Williams, 1977).  It is necessary 
to choose the location of the estimation period far enough away from the event to 
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eliminate any impact from the event itself but close enough to the event to reduce the 
effects of non-stationarity of the estimates.  The estimation period in this study ended 10 
trading days (two calendar weeks) before then event.  The estimation period spans from 
Day -210 to Day -11.  The models used to calculate the abnormal returns are summarized 
below; for a full description, see Brown and Warner (1985).   
 
Market Model 
 The Market Model controls for the systematic risk of the equity and is a derivative 
of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which suggests (and has been empirically 
verified (Scholes & Williams, 1977)) that the return for a particular equity is directly 
proportional to the return of the general market.  The return on a stock over a given time 
period is: 
itmtiiit rr εβα ++=  (1) 
where rit is the return for stock i on Day t, rmt is the market return on Day t (the CRSP 
Equal-Weighted Index serves as the proxy for the general market in this study), αi is the 
intercept of the regression for stock i; βi is the constant of proportionality between stock i 
and the market return, also known as the equity beta; and εit is the error term for stock i 
on Day t.  αi is an estimate of the constant daily return for stock i, βi rmt is the part of the 
return attributed to market-wide movements, and εit is the part of the price that cannot be 
attributed to the market (the firm-specific “abnormal return”).  αi, βi, and the variance of 
the error term εit (henceforth denoted σe
2) are estimated using an ordinary least squares 
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regression over the estimation period.4  By re-arranging Equation 1, the abnormal return 
for the Market Model can be expressed as: 
mtiiitit rrA βα −−=  (2) 
where Ait is the abnormal return for stock i on Day t.   
 
Mean Adjusted Returns Model 
While the Market Model is the preferred model for the estimation of abnormal 
returns because it captures the systematic risk of a firm, there is danger in using it 
exclusively.  To increase the sensitivity of the study and strengthen its internal validity, I 
also calculated the abnormal return using other models to ensure that the choice of model 
does not drive the nature of the results (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  One such model is 
the Mean Adjusted Returns Model: 
iitit rrA −= , (3) 
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where ir  is the mean of stock i’s daily return during the estimation period, and Dest is the 
number of days in the estimation period.   
 
Market Adjusted Returns Model 
mtitit rrA −=  (5) 
                                                 
4  Brown and Warner (1985) and Dyckman, et al. (1984) have shown that the choice between the ordinary 
least squares regression and the Scholes and Williams (1977) procedure that controls for nonsynchronous 
data to estimate the equity beta has no significant impact on the calculated abnormal returns. 
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In this model, the market return is a benchmark and every firm in the sample has the 
same characteristics as the general market.  There is no constant daily return for stock i 
(αi = 0) and each stock is assumed to have the same systematic risk as the general market 
(βi = 1).   
 
Size and Industry Adjusted Returns Model 
 This model controls for the effects of size and industry on the estimation of the 
abnormal returns.  Empirical studies have shown that the magnitudes of abnormal returns 
for small firms are greater than those for large firms (Banz, 1981; Fama & French, 1993; 
Reinganum, 1981).  It is also possible that abnormal returns could be affected by 
industry-wide movements relative to the market (Barber & Lyon, 1996).   
ctitit rrA −=  (6) 
where rct is the return on Day t for a control firm similar in size and industry to the 
sample firm.   
 In order to identify a control firm, a list of all companies with the same three-digit 
SIC code as the sample firm was generated using the Hoover’s database.  Companies not 
meeting the following criteria were removed from consideration: 
• Firms not publicly traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX at the time of the 
sample firm’s ISO 9000 certification announcement 
• Firms with insufficient stock information available through the CRSP database 
from Day -210 to Day +60 (approximately one calendar quarter after the 
announcement). 
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• Firms that announced ISO 9000 certification within two weeks of the sample 
firm. 
• Firms that appeared in the final test sample. 
 If these four criteria eliminated all companies from the list, the procedure was 
repeated for a two-digit SIC code match.  Of the companies that remained on the list, the 
control firm was specified as the one with the closest total sales to the sample firm for the 
year preceding the event date.  No control firm has total sales less than 50% or greater 
than 200% of the sample firm.  Control firms could not be found for seven firms, and 
they were not included in the final sample (Appendix A, criterion 14).   
 
Size and Industry Adjusted Market Model 
mtisisctitit rrrA βα −−−=  (7) 
where αis and βis are the intercept and slopes estimated by an ordinary least squares 
regression of rit – rct with rmt during EstP.  This model adjusts for size, industry, and 
systematic risk. 
 
Statistical Tests 
 The mean abnormal return on Day t is: 
∑
=
=
N
t
itt AN
A
1
1
 (8) 
where N is the number of samples with return observations on Day t.  The cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) over a given time period (t1, … , t2) is the sum of the daily mean 
abnormal returns and is useful in determining the impact of the announcement over 
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multiple days, particularly if the announcement was made soon before the closing bell.  
The CAR is: 
( ) ∑
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=
=
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 There have been many proposed statistical tests for the distribution and 
independence of abnormal returns.  Further information on many of these tests, including 
their theoretical underpinnings and empirical validation are available in the literature 
(Brown & Warner, 1980; Brown & Warner, 1985; Dyckman, et al., 1984).  In this study, 
the null hypotheses states that abnormal returns for a stock i are independent of other 
stocks in the sample, have mean equal to zero, and have variance Ŝεi
2.  When the analysis 
is expanded to cover more than one day (CARs), I also assume that there is no event 
clustering and that the abnormal returns are independent of the calendar time of the 
announcement.  This assumption is reasonable because certification announcements for 
any company are not more likely to occur at one time of year versus another.  The test 
statistic for any Day t is: 
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where Ŝεi
 is the estimated standard deviation.  The test statistic for multiple days is: 
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Equations 10 and 11 are t-test statistics used to determine the significance of the mean 
abnormal return. 
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 To ensure that outliers are not driving the results, additional tests are employed 
(Dyckman, et al., 1984; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  In order to 
determine whether the median abnormal return is significantly different than zero, the 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test is used.  Since the null hypothesis assumes that the abnormal 
returns are independent and normally distributed with a mean of zero, the probability of 
any return being greater than (or less than) zero is 0.5.  To test whether or not the 
proportion of abnormal returns greater than (or less than) zero is significantly different 
from 50%, the Binomial Sign Test is used.  Unlike the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test, 
which accounts for the relative distance between each abnormal return and zero, the 
Binomial Sign Test only considers whether the return is positive or negative and does not 
consider its absolute value.  Formulae and their derivations for these and other non-
parametric statistics based on sign and/or rank are widely described in the literature 
(Hollander & Wolfe, 1973; Lehmann, 1975). 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RESULTS 
 
Analysis of Abnormal Returns for Complete Sample of Firms 
Table 3 is a summary of the abnormal returns calculated for the entire sample  
(N = 204) using the three primary models (Market, Mean Adjusted, and Market Adjusted 
Models).  The table has the mean, median, and percent of positive abnormal returns for 
Days -1, 0 and +1, as well as the cumulative abnormal return for the day before and the 
day of the announcement (CAR(-1, 0)), and for the day of and the day after the 
announcement (CAR(0,+1)).5    
 
Table 3.  Abnormal Returns for the Complete Sample of 204 Announcements 
of ISO 9000 Certification
* 
 
 Day -1 Day 0 Day +1 CAR (-1,0) CAR (0,+1) 
Market Model 
Mean -0.25% (0.25) -0.02% (0.48) -0.15% (0.33) -0.26% (0.27) -0.17% (0.37) 
Median -0.31% (0.11) -0.37% (0.18) -0.15% (0.17) -0.59% (0.05) -0.06% (0.15) 
% Positive 45.10% (0.08) 45.10% (0.08) 46.57% (0.16) 45.59% (0.10) 49.51% (0.44) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.25% (0.25) 0.07% (0.43) -0.25% (0.24) -0.18% (0.34) -0.19% (0.36) 
Median -0.25% (0.06) -0.18% (0.22) -0.18% (0.06) -0.50% (0.06) -0.03% (0.15) 
% Positive 46.08% (0.13) 45.59% (0.10) 44.12% (0.05) 45.10% (0.08) 50.00% (0.50) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.22% (0.27) 0.07% (0.42) -0.15% (0.33) -0.15% (0.36) -0.08% (0.43) 
Median -0.27% (0.08) -0.28% (0.29) -0.09% (0.18) -0.53% (0.08) 0.13% (0.24) 
% Positive 44.61% (0.06) 44.61% (0.06) 48.53% (0.34) 43.63% (0.03) 51.96% (0.29) 
*The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test statistic 
tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of firms with a 
positive abnormal returns is different from 50%.  One-tailed p-values are in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
5 The Market Model results obtained for a post-event estimation period (Days +11 to +210) are very 
similar.  I also calculated CAR(-1,+1), and those results are also similar to those reported here.  For brevity 
and clarity, post-event estimation period Market Model and CAR(-1,+1) results are not reported here. 
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For the complete sample of announcements, while none of the mean abnormal 
returns are generally significantly different from zero at α =0.056, there are some 
exceptions.  The CAR(-1,0) median abnormal return is significant and negative with only 
the Market Model (p = 0.05).  Slightly less than half of all the returns were negative for 
all periods and in all three models, and the sign test was significant for the CAR(-1,0) 
Market Adjusted Model (p = 0.03) and the Day +1 Mean Adjusted Model (p = 0.05).  
Because the means and medians for each period and results of each model are relatively 
similar, there is no reason to suspect that neither the choice of models nor the presence of 
outliers is driving the results.  The significant Wilcoxon and sign tests on Day +1 and 
CAR (-1,0) suggest that there might be some leakage of information and continued 
inspection of the entire event window is warranted.   
 
Analysis of Change in Firm Risk 
 Even though there was no observed significant change in the market value of 
equity for the complete sample of firms, a change in the systematic risk could impact the 
rate at which future cash flows are discounted, leading to a change in the overall market 
value of the firm.  Table 4 contains information about the performance of equity and asset 
betas (βe and βa, respectively) and the financial leverage during the periods before and 
after the ISO 9000 certification announcement.  Following Hendricks and Singhal (1996), 
pre-announcement betas were measured during EstP (Days -210 to -11), and post-
announcement betas were measured from Days +11 to +210 in order to ensure a similar 
basis for pre- and post-announcement parameter estimates.  The pre-announcement debt 
                                                 
6 For the remainder of this thesis, the level of statistical significance is set at α = 0.05. 
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ratio is calculated using data from the most recent fiscal year completed before the 
announcement, and the post-announcement debt ratio is calculated using data from the 
first fiscal year completed after the announcement 
 
 
Table 4.  Measures of Equity and Asset Betas Before and After the Announcement 
of ISO 9000 Certification 
 
 Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement Difference
a 
p-Value
b 
Mean βe 1.27 1.30 0.03 0.63 
Median βe 1.10 1.19 0.05 0.40 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement βe 46.57% 0.33 
Mean βa 0.75 0.75 0.01 0.90 
Median βa 0.49 0.50 0.01 0.99 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement βa 47.55% 0.48 
Mean Debt Ratio 0.471 0.474 0.003 0.71 
Median Debt Ratio 0.483 0.483 -0.004 0.92 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement Debt Ratio 47.55% 0.40 
a  This is the average of the differences between pre-and post-announcement values, not the difference 
of the averages. 
b The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
statistic tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of 
firms with a decrease in post-announcement betas is different from 50%.  All p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
The mean (median) equity beta increases from 1.27 (1.10) to 1.30 (1.19) for a 
mean (median) increase of 0.03 (0.05) after the announcement of ISO 9000 certification.  
46.6% of the firms in the sample experienced a decrease in equity beta.  A change in the 
equity beta from 1.27 to 1.30 implies that future cash flows will be discounted at a higher 
rate, leading to a reduction in the market value of equity.  At a prime rate of 3% and a 
risk premium of 9%, the cost of equity would increase from 14.43% to 14.71%, or a 
1.88% reduction in the value of a perpetuity with no growth.  However, the mean 
(median) change in equity beta is not statistically different from zero  
(p = 0.63 (p = 0.40)), nor is the percentage of firms that experienced a decrease in equity 
beta different from 50% (p = 0.33).   
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Because financial leverage and equity risk are positively correlated, I also 
examine the debt ratio.  The debt ratio is defined as the total debt of a firm divided by the 
sum of the total debt and the market value of equity.  The mean (median) debt ratio 
changes from 0.471 (0.483) to 0.474 (0.483) for a mean (median) change of 0.003  
(-0.004) after the announcement of ISO 9000 certification.  52.9% of the firms in the 
sample experienced a decrease in the debt ratio.  The mean (median) change is not 
statistically different from zero (p = 0.71 (p = 0.92)), nor is the percentage of firms that 
experienced a decrease in the debt ratio different from 50% (p = 0.40).   
 Because a change in asset beta could also signal a change in equity beta, I also 
evaluated the performance of asset risk during the periods before and after an ISO 9000 
certification announcement.  However, because corporate debt is infrequently traded, 
returns on debt are difficult to find, and estimating future tax rates is difficult, direct 
measurements of asset betas are hard to make (Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  Instead, due 
to the relation between asset risk, equity risk, and financial leverage, asset betas can be 
indirectly computed based on leverage (Hamada, 1972).   
E
D
e
a
+
=
1
ββ  (12) 
where D is the book value of total debt and E is the market value of equity.  The mean 
(median) asset beta changes from 0.75 (0.49) to 0.75 (0.50) for an increase of 0.01 (0.01) 
after the announcement of ISO 9000 certification.  47.6% of the firms in the sample 
experienced a decrease in asset beta.  The mean (median) change is not statistically 
different from zero (p = 0.90 (p = 0.99)), nor is the percentage of firms that experienced a 
decrease in asset beta different from 50% (p = 0.48).  As expected, the behavior of the 
asset betas is very similar to the behavior of the equity betas.   
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 In order to determine the impact of ISO 9000 certification on the idiosyncratic 
risk of a firm, I also calculated the variance of the rate of return on equity (σe
2), the 
variance of the rate of return on assets (σa
2), and the residual standard error from the 
Market Model (Residual σ) (see Table 5).  Asset variances are calculated indirectly from 
the equity variances using Equation 13, while Equation 14 shows the relationship 
between asset variance and idiosyncratic risk. 
E
D
e
a
+
=
1
σ
σ  (13) 
2222
amai βσσσ −=  (14) 
where σi
2 is idiosyncratic risk and σm
2 is the variance of the market returns. 
Pre- and post-announcement variances were measured using daily stock returns from 
Days -210 to -11 and Days +11 to +210, respectively, in order to ensure a similar basis 
for pre- and post-announcement parameter estimates. 
 
 
Table 5. Measures of Variance Before and After the Announcement of ISO 9000 
Certification 
 
 Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement Difference
a 
p-Value
b 
Mean σe 0.0374 0.0380 0.0006 0.51 
Median σe 0.0348 0.0338 -0.0012 0.72 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement σe 53.92% 0.26 
Mean σa 0.0212 0.0213 0.0001 0.92 
Median σa 0.0171 0.0164 -0.0003 0.47 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement σa 53.92% 0.26 
Mean Residual σ 0.0492 0.0499 0.0007 0.58 
Median Residual σ 0.0461 0.0439 -0.0014 0.65 
% of Firms with Decrease in post-announcement Residual σ 55.39% 0.13 
a  This is the average of the differences between pre-and post-announcement values, not the difference 
of the averages. 
b The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
statistic tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of 
firms with a decrease in post-announcement betas is different from 50%.  All p-values are two-tailed. 
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 The mean (median) equity standard deviation changes from 0.0374 (0.0348) to 
0.0380 (0.0348) for a change of 0.0006 (-0.0012) after the announcement of ISO 9000 
certification.  53.9% of the firms in the sample experienced a decrease in equity standard 
deviation.  The mean (median) asset standard deviation changes from 0.0212 (0.0171) to 
0.0213 (0.0164) for a change of 0.0001 (-0.0003) after the announcement of ISO 9000 
certification.  53.9% of the firms in the sample experienced a decrease in asset standard 
deviation.  The mean (median) residual standard error changes from 0.0492 (0.0461) to 
0.0499 (0.0439) for a change of 0.0007 (-0.0014) after the announcement of ISO 9000 
certification.  55.4% of the firms in the sample experienced a decrease in equity standard 
deviation. As shown in Table 5, none of the differences in the pre-announcement and 
post-announcement values of these measures of risk are significantly different from zero.   
 Using an F-test, I determined that the cross-sectional variance of the residuals 
from the estimation period of the market model did not change significantly.  During 
EstP the estimated standard deviation of residuals was 0.0237; during Days +11 to +210 
the estimated standard deviation of residuals was 0.0256 (two-tailed p = 0.56).   
 
Analysis of Impact of Moderating Variables 
 In order to determine firm size impact on abnormal returns, the full sample of 204 
firms was split into two groups.  A firm was classified as large if its average assets from 
the fiscal years immediately preceding and following the ISO 9000 certification 
announcement were above the median for the whole sample ($224,469,000); those with 
assets below the sample median were classified as small.  Table 6 presents the abnormal 
returns for all models and event periods by large and small firms.  The results for the 
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event day (Day 0) are particularly interesting, because the large firms’ mean and median 
returns for every model are negative and statistically significant (p ≤ 0.03).  Anywhere 
from 39.2% to 42.2% of the large firm returns are less then zero, depending on the model 
used to generate the returns.  In each case, the sign test is significantly different from 
50% (p ≤ 0.06).  For small firms, only the Day –1 median from the Mean Adjusted Model 
is statistically different from zero (p = 0.04).  The skewness of the Day 0 small firms is 
approximately equal to one for each of the return generating models.  Anywhere from 2 
to 4 of the 102 abnormal returns are greater than 15%, depending on the model that is 
used.  Nonetheless, the large firm means, which range from -1.10% to -0.68%, and small  
 
Table 6. Comparison of Large Firm to Small Firm Equity Abnormal Returns
* 
Panel A: Large Firms (N = 102) 
N=102 Day -1 Day 0 Day +1 CAR (-1,0) CAR (0,+1) 
Market Model 
Mean 0.02% (0.47) -0.68% (0.03) -0.09% (0.39) -0.66% (0.08) -0.77% (0.04) 
Median -0.29% (0.25) -0.43% (0.03) -0.14% (0.28) -0.47% (0.04) -0.27% (0.04) 
% Positive 46.08% (0.21) 42.16% (0.06) 46.08% (0.21) 43.14% (0.08) 47.06% (0.28) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean 0.20% (0.29) -0.68% (0.03) -0.09% (0.39) -0.48% (0.16) -0.77% (0.04) 
Median -0.10% (0.34) -0.43% (0.03) -0.14% (0.28) -0.30% (0.08) -0.27% (0.04) 
% Positive 50.00% (0.50) 42.16% (0.06) 46.08% (0.21) 43.14% (0.08) 47.06% (0.28) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean 0.10% (0.39) -0.71% (0.03) -0.17% (0.32) -0.61% (0.11) -0.88% (0.03) 
Median -0.28% (0.20) -0.50% (0.03) -0.09% (0.23) -0.78% (0.03) -0.48% (0.02) 
% Positive 46.08% (0.21) 39.22% (0.01) 48.04% (0.35) 39.22% (0.01) 47.06% (0.28) 
Size & Industry Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.02% (0.48) -1.10% (0.005) 0.21% (0.33) -1.13% (0.05) -0.89% (0.07) 
Median -0.40% (0.19) -0.54% (0.01) -0.12% (0.38) -0.87% (0.02) -0.47% (0.18) 
% Positive 44.12% (0.12) 42.16% (0.06) 49.02% (0.42) 43.14% (0.08) 43.14% (0.08) 
Size & Industry Adjusted Market Model 
Mean 0.04% (0.46) -0.99% (0.01) 0.41% (0.19) -0.95% (0.07) -0.58% (0.17) 
Median -0.40% (0.21) -0.63% (0.02) 0.11% (0.22) -0.85% (0.03) -0.11% (0.30) 
% Positive 45.10% (0.16) 42.16% (0.06) 50.98% (0.42) 41.18% (0.04) 50.00% (0.50) 
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Table 6. Comparison of Large Firm to Small Firm Equity Abnormal Returns
 
(continued) 
Panel B. Small Firms (N = 102) 
N=102 Day -1 Day 0 Day +1 CAR (-1,0) CAR (0,+1) 
Market Model 
Mean -0.52% (0.22) 0.65% (0.13) -0.21% (0.36) 0.13% (0.43) 0.43% (0.31) 
Median -0.32% (0.15) -0.14% (0.32) -0.17% (0.22) -0.70% (0.27) 0.17% (0.47) 
% Positive 44.12% (0.12) 48.04% (0.35) 47.06% (0.28) 48.04% (0.35) 51.96% (0.35) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.70% (0.13) 0.65% (0.13) -0.21% (0.36) -0.05% (0.47) 0.43% (0.31) 
Median -0.36% (0.04) -0.14% (0.32) -0.17% (0.22) -0.88% (0.20) 0.17% (0.47) 
% Positive 42.16% (0.06) 48.04% (0.35) 47.06% (0.28) 43.14% (0.08) 51.96% (0.35) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.53% (0.20) 0.85% (0.07) -0.14% (0.41) 0.32% (0.32) 0.71% (0.21) 
Median -0.25% (0.12) -0.03% (0.16) -0.11% (0.27) -0.39% (0.40) 0.62% (0.27) 
% Positive 43.14% (0.08) 50.00% (0.50) 49.02% (0.42) 48.04% (0.35) 56.86% (0.08) 
Size & Industry Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.82% (0.15) 0.74% (0.20) 0.55% (0.25) -0.08% (0.47) 1.29% (0.14) 
Median -1.07% (0.21) 0.22% (0.28) 0.51% (0.26) -0.24% (0.48) 0.62% (0.32) 
% Positive 42.16% (0.06) 50.98% (0.42) 51.96% (0.35) 49.02% (0.42) 52.94% (0.28) 
Size & Industry Adjusted Market Model 
Mean -0.82% (0.16) 0.63% (0.24) 0.55% (0.24) -0.19% (0.43) 1.18% (0.16) 
Median -0.89% (0.26) 0.04% (0.31) 0.84% (0.27) -0.36% (0.46) 0.17% (0.39) 
% Positive 44.12% (0.12) 50.00% (0.50) 52.94% (0.28) 48.04% (0.35) 50.98% (0.42) 
*The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test statistic 
tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of firms with a 
positive abnormal returns is different from 50%.  One-tailed p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
firm means, which range from 0.63% to 0.85%, are significantly different from each 
other in a one-tailed t-test (p ≤ 0.05).   
The observed difference in the mean abnormal returns between the large and 
small firm sub-samples could be a result of the “small firm effect” documented by Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981).  Furthermore, industry-wide effects could be driving these 
results, particularly since the mean assets of firms within different industry sectors vary 
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widely.7  To control for these factors, I also report the results from the Size and Industry 
Adjusted Model and the Size and Industry Adjusted Market Model in Table 6.  For both 
the large and small firm sub-samples, these two models generate abnormal returns similar 
to the three primary models.  The proportions of positive abnormal returns are also 
similar, suggesting that neither the “small firm effect” nor industry-wide market 
movements are the cause of the significantly less negative returns observed for small 
firms. 
The negative abnormal returns observed for large firms could be the result of a 
shift in wealth from equityholders to bondholders due to a decrease in the variance of the 
rate of return of the firm’s assets (Galai & Masulis, 1976).  In this situation, measuring 
only the abnormal returns or the change in the market value of equity could be 
underestimating the total impact of the certification announcement on the market value of 
the firm.  Conversely, in the case of the small firm sub-sample, the magnitude of the 
market reaction to ISO 9000 certification was only marginally positive.  However, if the 
variance of the rate of return of the firm’s assets remains unchanged, measuring only the 
change in the market value of equity always underestimates the impact of the 
announcement on the overall market value of the firm (Black & Scholes, 1973; Galai & 
Masulis, 1976).  Table 7 shows the change in the variance of the rate of return of assets 
for the sub-samples.  For large firms, the mean (median) reduction in the standard 
deviation of 0.0014 (0.0005) is statistically significant (p = 0.005 (p = 0.02)).  Over 60% 
of the large firms experienced a reduction in asset variance, and the sign test is 
                                                 
7  For example, the mean assets for the 8 finance firms in the sample is nearly $500 billion, or about 650 
times the mean assets for the 30 instrumentation and medical device firms ($750 million).  For a 
complete breakdown of firm size by industry sector, see Table 2. 
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significantly different from 50% (p = 0.02).  For small firms, the mean (median) increase 
in the standard deviation of 0.0015 (0.0006) is not statistically significant from zero  
(p = 0.26 (p = 0.39)).  Fewer than 50% of the small firms experienced an increase in asset 
variance, but the sign test is insignificant (p = 0.43).   
 
Table 7. Measures of Variance in the Rate of Return on a Firm’s Assets Before and 
After the Announcement of ISO 9000 Certification, Large and Small Firm Sub-
Samples 
 
 Pre-Announcement Post-Announcement Difference
a 
p-Value
b 
Large Firm Mean σa 0.0139 0.0126 -0.0014 0.005 
Large Firm Median σa 0.0100 0.0101 -0.0005 0.02 
% of Large Firms with Decrease in post-announcement σe 61.76% 0.02 
Small Firm Mean σa 0.0285 0.0300 0.0015 0.26 
Small Firm Median σa 0.0265 0.0279 0.0006 0.39 
% of Small Firms with Decrease in post-announcement σa 46.08% 0.43 
a  This is the average of the differences between pre-and post-announcement values, not the difference 
of the averages. 
b The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
statistic tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of 
firms with a decrease in post-announcement betas is different from 50%.  All p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that large firms experience a decrease in the 
market value of equity after an ISO 9000 certification announcement as evidenced by 
significant negative Day 0 abnormal returns.  That reduction is likely the result of a shift 
of wealth from equityholders to bondholders because of a decrease in the variance of the 
rate of return on assets.  Therefore, the total impact of ISO 9000 certification 
announcements on the overall market value of large firms is tempered by that value shift 
and may be greater than the impact on the market value of equity.  Small firms 
experience an increase in the market value of equity as evidenced by marginally 
significant positive abnormal returns.  The increase in overall market value is likely 
larger because the asset variance of the firm does not significantly change.  Neither the 
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“small firm effect” nor industry-wide market movements are driving the results.  These 
outcomes suggest the announcement of ISO 9000 certification results in a more positive 
change in market value for small firms than for large firms.  These findings are in 
concurrence with Docking and Dowen (1999), who observed significant increases in 
stock prices after ISO 9000 registration only for smaller firms.   
Table 8 shows abnormal returns in sub-samples according to the standard to 
which the firm was certified, i.e., ISO 9001:1994, 9002:1994, and 9001:2000.  None of 
the Day 0 or Day +1 means is significantly different from zero, but the Day -1 returns are 
worth further discussion.  For announcements to the ISO 9001:1994 standard, the mean 
Day -1 abnormal returns range from -0.75% to -0.66% and the medians range from  
-0.82% to -0.73% depending on the model that is used.  The means are marginally 
significant (p ≤ 0.10), and the medians are statistically significant (p ≤ 0.04).  Fewer than 
40% of the Day -1 abnormal returns are positive regardless of the model that is used, and 
the sign test is significantly different from 50% (p ≤ 0.02).  For announcements to the 
ISO 9002:1994 standard, none of the mean or median abnormal returns is significantly 
different from zero, nor is the percentage of positive returns significantly different from 
50%.  For announcements to the ISO 9001:2000 standard, the mean Day -1 abnormal 
returns range from 0.98% to 1.20% and are marginally significant (p ≤ 0.10).  The mean 
Day -1 abnormal returns for announcements to ISO 9001:2000 are significantly greater  
(p ≤ 0.03) than the mean returns for announcements to the 1994 standards (both ISO 
9001:1994 and ISO 9002:1994). 
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Table 8. Comparison of 2000 Standard to 1994 Standards Equity Abnormal  
Returns 
 
Panel A: ISO 9001:1994 (N=99) 
N=99 Day -1 Day 0 Day +1 CAR (-1,0) CAR (0,+1) 
Market Model 
Mean -0.75% (0.09) -0.04% (0.47) -0.49% (0.17) -0.79% (0.11) -0.53% (0.25) 
Median -0.77% (0.04) -0.37% (0.27) -0.41% (0.07) -1.21% (0.02) -0.04% (0.20) 
% Positive 38.38% (0.01) 43.43% (0.10) 44.44% (0.13) 39.39% (0.02) 49.49% (0.46) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.70% (0.09) -0.01% (0.49) -0.45% (0.20) -0.70% (0.13) -0.46% (0.28) 
Median -0.73% (0.01) -0.36% (0.22) -0.45% (0.06) -0.76% (0.02) 0.01% (0.21) 
% Positive 39.39% (0.02) 40.40% (0.03) 41.41% (0.04) 41.41% (0.04) 50.51% (0.46) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.66% (0.10) -0.01% (0.49) -0.44% (0.20) -0.67% (0.13) -0.45% (0.28) 
Median -0.82% (0.02) -0.37% (0.27) -0.25% (0.12) -1.00% (0.02) 0.04% (0.26) 
% Positive 37.37% (0.01) 41.41% (0.04) 46.46% (0.24) 37.37% (0.01) 50.51% (0.46) 
Panel B: ISO 9002:1994 (N=57) 
Market Model 
Mean -0.41% (0.26) 0.16% (0.41) 0.33% (0.30) -0.26% (0.37) 0.49% (0.31) 
Median -0.31% (0.28) -0.80% (0.25) -0.14% (0.41) -0.87% (0.19) -0.22% (0.35) 
% Positive 45.61% (0.25) 45.61% (0.25) 45.61% (0.25) 42.11% (0.12) 49.12% (0.45) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.54% (0.20) 0.30% (0.33) 0.15% (0.42) -0.25% (0.37) 0.45% (0.34) 
Median 0.02% (0.32) -0.02% (0.40) -0.13% (0.21) -1.30% (0.13) 0.03% (0.38) 
% Positive 50.88% (0.45) 49.12% (0.45) 43.86% (0.18) 42.11% (0.12) 50.88% (0.45) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean -0.65% (0.16) 0.36% (0.31) 0.44% (0.26) -0.29% (0.35) 0.80% (0.22) 
Median -0.06% (0.20) -0.27% (0.38) -0.12% (0.49) -1.72% (0.12) 0.15% (0.46) 
% Positive 47.37% (0.35) 45.61% (0.25) 47.37% (0.35) 43.86% (0.18) 52.63% (0.35) 
Panel C: ISO 9001:2000 (N=50) 
Market Model 
Mean 0.98% (0.10) 0.00% (0.50) -0.16% (0.40) 0.98% (0.13) -0.15% (0.41) 
Median 0.43% (0.20) -0.26% (0.47) 0.00% (0.47) 0.63% (0.14) -0.06% (0.39) 
% Positive 58.00% (0.13) 48.00% (0.39) 50.00% (0.50) 62.00% (0.04) 50.00% (0.50) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
Mean 0.99% (0.09) 0.13% (0.43) -0.41% (0.24) 1.11% (0.12) -0.29% (0.34) 
Median 0.10% (0.24) 0.06% (0.46) -0.06% (0.36) 0.33% (0.14) -0.13% (0.28) 
% Positive 56.00% (0.20) 52.00% (0.39) 48.00% (0.39) 56.00% (0.20) 48.00% (0.39) 
Market Adjusted Model 
Mean 1.20% (0.06) 0.06% (0.47) -0.38% (0.26) 1.25% (0.08) -0.32% (0.31) 
Median 0.08% (0.14) -0.01% (0.41) 0.24% (0.33) 0.38% (0.09) 0.13% (0.31) 
% Positive 56.00% (0.20) 50.00% (0.50) 52.00% (0.39) 56.00% (0.20) 54.00% (0.29) 
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Table 8. Comparison of 2000 Standard to 1994 Standards Equity Abnormal 
Returns (continued) 
 
Panel D: T-Test For Equity of Means (1994 vs. 2000 Series Standards) 
 Day -1 Day 0 Day +1 CAR(-1,0) CAR(0,+1) 
Market Model 
T-statistic 1.900 (0.03) -0.047 (0.48) 0.031 (0.49) 1.584 (0.06) -0.014 (0.49) 
Mean Adjusted Model 
T-statistic 1.955 (0.03) 0.019 (0.49) -0.259 (0.40) 1.559 (0.06) -0.187 (0.43) 
Market Adjusted Model 
T-statistic 2.223 (0.02) -0.098 (0.46) -0.383 (0.35) 1.772 (0.04) -0.394 (0.35) 
*The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
statistic tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of 
firms with a positive abnormal returns is different from 50%.  One-tailed p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
It may be possible that a correlation between firm size and certification standard 
could be driving these results (i.e., many large firms pursuing certification to the 1994 
standards and many small firms pursuing certification to the 2000 standard).  To 
determine if this was the case, I divided the firms into four sub-samples: large 1994 
registered firms (N = 75), small 1994 registered firms (N = 80), large 2000 registered 
firms (N = 28), and small 2000 registered firms (N = 22).  Table 9 contains the  
CAR(-1,0) for each of the five models.8  The mean (median) abnormal returns for large 
firms announcing certification to the 1994 standards range from -1.72% (-1.32%) to  
-0.44% (-0.76%).  The large 1994 means are statistically significant for the Size & 
Industry Adjusted Model (p = 0.02) and the Size & Industry Adjusted Market Model  
(p = 0.03), and the medians are statistically less than zero for all five models (p ≤ 0.05).  
The mean (median) abnormal returns for small firms announcing certification to the 1994 
standards range from -0.86% (-1.30%) to -0.43% (-0.91%).  None of the small 1994 
                                                 
8  I analyzed the results for each of the event periods, but the CAR (-1,0) results are worth further 
examination due to the statistical significance on Day 0 when the sample was divided by size and on  
Day -1 when the sample was divided by standard classification.  For the sake of brevity, only the  
CAR (-1,0) results are reported hereafter. 
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means are statistically different from zero, and the median is statistically less than zero 
only for the Mean Adjusted Model (p = 0.05).  This suggests that firm size alone is not 
driving the results for announcements to the 1994 standards.  The market value of equity 
decreases for a firm announcing certification to the 1994 standards, but the change is 
tempered if the firm is small.9 
The mean (median) abnormal return for large firms announcing certification to 
the 2000 standard ranges from –0.25% (-0.15%) to 0.83% (0.48%) and is not statistically 
different from zero for any of the five models.  The mean (median) abnormal return for 
small firms announcing certification to the 2000 standard ranges from 2.22% (1.46%) to 
3.04% (2.40%).  None of the means is statistically different from zero, and only the 
median from the Market Adjusted Model is statistically significant (p = 0.05).  
Approximately two-thirds of all small firms experienced a positive reaction to the 
announcement of ISO 9001:2000 certification, and the sign tests for three of the five 
models are statistically significant (p = 0.04).  The market value of equity increases for a 
firm announcing certification to the 2000 standard, but this reaction is tempered if the 
firm is large.10  Statistical values are not necessarily predictive because of the small 
                                                 
9  The mean (median) standard deviation of the rate of return on the firm’s assets for large firms 
announcing certification to the 1994 standards decreases by 0.0005 (0.0003), which is insignificantly 
different from zero (p = 0.25 (0.35)).  The mean (median) standard deviation of the rate of return on the 
firm’s assets for small firms announcing certification to the 1994 standards increases by 0.0024 (0.0015), 
which is insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.14 (0.15)).  Because there is a shift in the market value 
of equity but not in the asset variance, there may be a shift in wealth from equity holders to bondholders, 
and the total change in the market value of equity may underestimate the total impact on the overall 
market value of the firm (Black & Scholes, 1973; Galai & Masulis, 1976).  
10 The mean (median) standard deviation of the rate of return on the firm’s assets for large firms 
announcing certification to ISO 9001:2000 decreases by 0.0038 (0.0025), which is significantly different 
from zero (p = 0.004 (0.005)).  The mean (median) standard deviation of the rate of return on the firm’s 
assets for small firms announcing certification to ISO 9001:2000 decreases by 0.0018 (0.0018), which is 
insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.18 (0.24)).  Because there is an increase in the market value of 
equity and possibly a decrease in the asset variance, there may be a shift in wealth from equity holders to 
bondholders, and the total change in the market value of equity may underestimate the total impact on the 
overall market value of the firm (Black & Scholes, 1973; Galai & Masulis, 1976).   
  52  
sample sizes related to ISO 9001:2000 certification.  Nonetheless, I can safely assert that 
firm size alone is not driving the results for announcements related to the 2000 standard.  
I can also state that the market reaction to ISO 9001:2000 certification is significantly 
more positive than the reaction to ISO 9001:1994 or ISO 9002:1994.   
 
Table 9.  (CAR(-1,0)) for Firm Size and Standard Classification (1994 Standards 
and 2000 Standard) 
 
 Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market 
Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted 
Market Model 
 
Announcements by Large Firms to the 1994 Standards (N=75) 
Mean -0.65% (0.12) -0.44% (0.22) -0.62% (0.14) -1.72% (0.02) -1.50% (0.03) 
Median -0.87% (0.03) -0.76% (0.05) -1.27% (0.03) -1.32% (0.01) -1.07% (0.01) 
% 
Positive 
38.67% (0.02) 40.00% (0.04) 36.00% (0.01) 36.00% (0.01) 36.00% (0.01) 
 
Announcements by Small Firms to the 1994 Standards (N=80) 
Mean -0.54% (0.25) -0.63% (0.21) -0.43% (0.28) -0.85% (0.26) -0.86% (0.26) 
Median -1.30% (0.09) -0.99% (0.05) -0.91% (0.10) -1.08% (0.27) -1.02% (0.22) 
% 
Positive 
42.50% (0.09) 43.75% (0.13) 43.75% (0.13) 43.75% (0.13) 43.75% (0.13) 
 
Announcements by Large Firms to the 2000 Standard (N=28) 
Mean -0.25% (0.39) -0.22% (0.42) -0.16% (0.44) 0.77% (0.26) 0.83% (0.25) 
Median 0.27% (0.38) -0.15% (0.49) -0.11% (0.49) 0.48% (0.24) 0.10% (0.24) 
% 
Positive 
57.14% (0.22) 46.43% (0.35) 50.00% (0.50) 64.29% (0.07) 57.14% (0.22) 
 
Announcements by Small Firms to the 2000 Standard (N=22) 
Mean 2.55% (0.34) 2.80% (0.36) 3.04% (0.38) 2.72% (0.36) 2.22% (0.32) 
Median 1.46% (0.12) 1.50% (0.10) 2.02% (0.05) 2.40% (0.11) 2.12% (0.13) 
% 
Positive 
68.18% (0.04) 68.18% (0.04) 63.64% (0.10) 68.18% (0.04) 63.64% (0.10) 
*The Student T-test statistic tests if the mean is different from zero; Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test statistic 
tests if the median is different from zero; Binomial Sign Test statistic tests if the percentage of firms with a 
positive abnormal returns is different from 50%.  One-tailed p-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
For added robustness, I also test the relations between abnormal returns on both 
size and standard classification using the following regression model: 
iiii ClassSizeA εααα +++= 210  (15) 
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where Ai is the abnormal return of stock i.  Sizei is the natural logarithm of the average 
assets in the fiscal years preceding and during the announcement, and in accordance with 
H3, the term is predicted to be negative.  Classi indicates the standard to which the firm 
was certified.  This variable takes a value of 0 for firms certified to ISO 9001:1994 or 
ISO 9002:1994, and it takes a value of 1 for firms certified to ISO 9001:2000.  εi is the 
random error term.  Regressions were calculated for all five return-generating models. 
 The regression results are reported in Table 10.  In accordance with H3 and H4, 
the coefficient for size is predicted to be negative, while the coefficient for classification 
is predicted to be positive.  The model offers no evidence to support either H3 or H4; 
however, Classi is a binary, not a continuous variable, so the relationship may be stronger 
than predicted by the regression model.  Furthermore, the intercept term is significantly 
different from zero in only one of the 25 regression models.   
 The results described above could be due to a poor fit of the regression model.  In 
fact, only the Day -1 regression models are significant and only if industry effects are 
taken into account.  The F-values for the Day -1 Size and Industry Adjusted Model and 
the Size and Industry Adjusted Market Model are significant at α = 0.05, with values of 
3.87 and 3.57, respectively.  R2 values for all 25 models are less that 4%, much less than 
would be expected for a well-fitting regression model, even for cross-sectional data such 
as these.  Because the regression models are generally poor fits of the return data, there 
may be other factors that moderate the sign and magnitude of equity abnormal returns 
beside firm size and standard classification.  While an exploratory analysis of such 
factors is beyond the scope of this paper, the topic is worthy of further study.  
      
Table 10.  Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses) from Regressions of Event Period Abnormal Returns on Size and 
Standard Classification 
 
 
Day -1 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry Adjusted 
Market Model 
Intercept ? -0.0137 (-1.48) -0.0153 (-1.70)a -0.0126 (-1.40) -0.0188 (-1.64) -0.0195 (-1.67)a 
Size - 0.0161 (1.87)a 0.0161 (1.93)a 0.0185 (2.23)b 0.0282 (2.65)b 0.0270 (2.50)b 
Classification + 0.0013 (0.88) 0.0015 (1.10) 0.0010 (0.73) 0.0013 (0.75) 0.0015 (0.86) 
N   204 204 204 204 204 
Model F-value   2.18 2.54 2.79 3.87a 3.57a 
R2   2.12% 2.46% 2.70% 3.70% 3.43% 
Day 0 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry Adjusted 
Market Model 
Intercept ? 0.0114 (1.32) 0.0135 (1.52) 0.0146 (1.67)a 0.0103 (0.83) 0.0089 (0.72) 
Size - 0.0006 (0.07) 0.0012 (0.14) 0.0003 (0.03) 0.0015 (0.13) -0.0003 (-0.02) 
Classification + -0.0020 (-1.51) -0.0023 (-1.65)a -0.0024 (-1.79)a -0.0021 (-1.12) -0.0018 (-0.96) 
N   204 204 204 204 204 
Model F-value   1.15 1.37 1.60 0.64 0.47 
R2   1.13% 1.35% 1.57% 0.63% 0.46% 
Day +1 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry Adjusted 
Market Model 
Intercept ? -0.0036 (-0.42) -0.0020 (-0.22) -0.0029 (-0.34) 0.0029 (0.25) 0.0027 (0.24) 
Size - -0.0001 (-0.01)a -0.0021 (-0.25) -0.0030 (-0.38) 0.0161 (1.49) 0.0159 (1.50) 
Classification + 0.0004 (0.28) 0.0000 (-0.01) 0.0004 (0.28) -0.0005 (-0.29) -0.0003 (-0.18) 
N   204 204 204 204 204 
Model F-value   0.04 0.03 0.11 1.14 1.14 
R2   0.04% 0.03% 0.11% 1.12% 1.12% 
5
4
 
      
Table 10.  Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses) from Regressions of Event Period Abnormal Returns on Size and 
Standard Classification (continued) 
 
Significant at (a) α = 0.05, (b) α = 0.01 
 
CAR(-1,0) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Market Model 
Intercept ? -0.0024 (-0.22) -0.0018 (-0.16) 0.0021 (0.20) -0.0085 (-0.53) -0.0105 (-0.65) 
Size - 0.0166 (1.68) 0.0173 (1.73)a 0.0188 (1.93)a 0.0297 (1.98)a 0.0267 (1.77)a 
Classification + -0.0007 (-0.46) -0.0007 (-0.45) -0.0014 (-0.87) -0.0008 (-0.33) -0.0003 (-0.12) 
N   204 204 204 204 204 
Model F-value   1.49 1.57 2.20 1.99 1.58 
R2   1.46% 1.54% 2.14% 1.94% 1.54% 
CAR(0,+1) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Market Model 
Mean Adjusted 
Model 
Market Adjusted 
Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Model 
Size & Industry 
Adjusted Market Model 
Intercept ? 0.0077 (0.63) 0.0116 (0.91) 0.0117 (0.93) 0.0132 (0.78) 0.0117 (0.70) 
Size - 0.0005 (0.04) -0.0009 (-0.08) -0.0028 (-0.24) 0.0175 (1.12) 0.0156 (1.01) 
Classification + -0.0016 (-0.86) -0.0023 (-1.16) -0.0020 (-1.06) -0.0027 (-1.03) -0.0021 (-0.83) 
N   204 204 204 204 204 
Model F-value   0.37 0.68 0.60 1.13 0.83 
R2   0.37% 0.67% 0.59% 1.11% 0.82% 
5
5
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Dollar Change in the Market Value of Equity 
 Table 11 presents summary statistics for the actual dollar change in the market 
value of equity during the period surrounding an ISO 9000 certification announcement.  
The table presents results for the complete sample and the various sub-samples.  Because 
I observed significant wealth effects on both Day –1 and Day 0, I computed the 
compounded abnormal return CmARi(t1,t2) from the day before the announcement to the 
day of the announcement.  This figure represents the total amount of money gained or 
lost by the shareholders of the firm assuming the shares were purchased at the Day -1 
opening bell and sold at the Day 0 closing bell.  The compounded abnormal return is: 
( ) )1(, 2
1
21 it
t
tt
i AttCmAR += ∏
=
 (16) 
where Ait is the abnormal return for stock i on Day t.  For these calculations, I used the 
Market Model returns since they control for the systematic risk of the stock.  The dollar 
change in the market value of equity $i(t1,t2) is then: 
( ) [ ] [ ] ( )[ ]211121 ,,$ 11 ttCmARPSOtt tti ⋅⋅= −−  (17) 
where 11−tSO  is the number of shares outstanding on the day before the period of interest, 
11−t
P  is the stock’s closing price on the day before the period of interest.   
 The mean absolute change in market value may be misleading because the 
measure is heavily biased towards large or highly capitalized firms.  For this reason, 
statistic tests were not performed on these measurements and are presented in Table 11 as 
purely descriptive.  Outliers can and do in this case significantly impact the results.  The 
total sample of firms lost $111.8 billion during the Day(-1,0) event period.  However, 
almost 90% of this loss is attributed to one firm (Merisel), which is a large firm that 
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announced the extension of ISO 9001:1994 certification to a new facility.11  Hence, these 
sub-samples are similarly skewed to the left.  The median change in market value is 
likely a better indicator for these affected sub-samples.   
 
Table 11.  Dollar Change (in $1000s) in the Market Value of Equity Compounded 
from Day -1 to Day 0 (ISO 9000 Certification Announcement Day) 
 
 
N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Complete Sample 204 -548,102 -404 7,081,237 7,008,576 -99,978,863 
Large Firms 102 -1,096,491 -8,289 10,008,837 7,008,576 -99,978,863 
Small Firms 102 287 -144 8,502 48,426 -40,809 
ISO 9001:1994 
Announcements 
99 -989,514 -596 10,104,169 7,008,576 -99,978,863 
ISO 9002:1994 
Announcements 
57 -250,693 259 1,543,013 4,466,597 -8,910,822 
ISO 9001:2000 
Announcements 
50 8,958 -1,152 169,889 654,510 -664,274 
 
  
 
Post-announcement Stock Price Performance 
 It is possible that the market could have a later reaction outside the event window 
because investors might not be aware of the certification until after the announcement 
(i.e., when it is published in a quarterly database of registered companies).  It is also 
possible that the market could have over- or under-reacted to the announcement in the 
short-term (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003).  To test if there are any abnormal returns that 
                                                 
11 Three days after the announcement, the Wall Street Journal published a Business Brief that Merisel was 
cutting 400 jobs and expected a loss of $0.15 to $0.20 a share for the upcoming quarter.  These losses 
were the result of restructuring plans that had been announced about two weeks prior to the certification 
announcement.  It is possible that such a large loss could be late reaction to the unfavorable news of 
restructuring.  The firm was not removed from the sample because only one article was published in the 
Wall Street Journal within a week of the certification announcement (Appendix A, Criterion 8).  I note 
that if I drop this firm from this analysis, the mean (median) change in the market value of equity (in 
$1000s) is -58,295 (-396) for the complete sample, -117,457 (-7.844) for large firms, and 20,581 (-505) 
for ISO 9001:1994 firms. 
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occur after the event window, I also tested the stock price performance for 60 trading 
days after the announcement.12 
 All cumulative abnormal returns for this section are calculated using the Market 
Adjusted Model.  The mean (median) 60 day cumulative abnormal return for the entire 
sample of firms is 7.95% (1.95%), The mean 60 day CAR is significantly greater than 
zero (two-tailed p = 0.006), but the median is only marginally significant (two-tailed  
p = 0.09).  52.9% of the returns are positive, which is insignificantly different from 50% 
(two-tailed p = 0.40).  Since firm size or standard stringency may be driving the results, 
the analysis is repeated for both large firm and small firm sub-samples.  For large firms, 
the mean (median) 60 day CAR is –2.51% (-0.33%), which is insignificantly different 
from zero (two-tailed p = 0.37 (0.72)).  Exactly 50% of the large firm 60 day CARs are 
positive.  For small firms, mean (median) 60 day CAR is 18.40% (3.41%), which is 
significantly greater than zero (two-tailed p = 0.0002 (0.006)).  55.9% of the returns are 
positive, which is insignificantly different from 50% (p = 0.24).  For the sub-sample of 
firms announcing certification to the 1994 standards (N = 155), the mean (median) 60 
day CAR is 11.82% (4.00%), which is significantly greater than zero (two-tailed p = 
0.001 (0.008)).  58.1% of the returns are positive, which is marginally significantly 
different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.05).  For the sub-sample of firms announcing 
certification to ISO 9001:2000 (N = 50), the mean (median) 60 day CAR is  
                                                 
12 60 trading days is about one calendar quarter.  During this time, a firm will have at least one quarterly 
earnings report and its ISO 9000 registration would have been published in the quarterly database of 
registered companies.  Other than these practical concerns, there is no theoretical underpinning for the 
optimal time period to assess if the market has overreacted or underreacted to the announcement, and 
there is no guarantee that other factors could influence the results (Hendricks & Singhal, 2003). 
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-3.70% (-5.48%), which is insignificantly less than zero (two-tailed p = 0.42 (0.21)).  
38.0% of the returns are positive, which is marginally significantly different from 50% 
(two-tailed p = 0.09). 
The nature of these results suggests that outliers, particularly in the case of small 
firms, may be driving the results.  Four firms were identified as having 60 day cumulative 
abnormal returns beyond the upper control limit of three sample standard deviations for 
the entire sample (122.41%).13  The analysis was repeated with the four outliers removed.  
The mean (median) 60 day CAR for the trimmed sample (N = 200) is 5.01% (1.81%).  
The mean is statistically significant (two-tailed p = 0.05), but the median is 
insignificantly different from zero (two-tailed p = 0.20).  52.0% of the returns are 
positive, which is insignificantly different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.57).  For the 
trimmed sample of small firms (N = 98), the mean (median) 60 day CAR is 12.83% 
(2.47%), which is significantly greater than zero (two-tailed p = 0.002 (0.03)).  54.1% of 
the returns are positive, which is insignificantly different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.42).  
For the trimmed sample of firms announcing certification to the 1994 standards  
(N = 151), the mean (median) 60 day CAR is 8.03% (3.90%), which is significantly 
greater than zero (two-tailed p = 0.007 (0.03)).  56.9% of the returns are positive, which 
is marginally significantly different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.09).  For the sub-sample 
of firms announcing certification to ISO 9001:2000 (N = 50), the mean (median) 60 day 
cumulative abnormal return is -3.70% (-5.48%), which is insignificantly less than zero 
(two-tailed p = 0.42 (0.21)).  38.0% of the returns are positive, which is marginally 
significantly different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.09).  
                                                 
13 The four firms are En Pointe Technologies, Emcore Corporation, Intelligroup, and AML 
Communications.  Each of these firms was classified as small based on total assets. 
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Figure 1.  Mean Market Adjusted Shareholder Gain, Cumulated on a Daily Basis 
Starting on the Day Before the Announcement to 60 Days Later 
 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean cumulative abnormal return (outliers trimmed) for the 
60 day period following the announcement and the behavior of the stock price during the 
event period itself.  Large firms and those announcing ISO 9001:2000 certification 
exhibit relatively flat abnormal returns in the calendar quarter following the 
announcement.  Small firms and those announcing certification to the 1994 standards 
exhibit some positive gains in the second month following the announcement, but the 
levels of abnormal performance are relatively flat in the first and third months after the 
announcement.  Because the other sub-samples exhibit such flat abnormal performance, it 
appears that small firms announcing certification to the 1994 standards are driving the 
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Figure 2.  Median Market Adjusted Shareholder Gain, Cumulated on a Daily Basis 
Starting on the Day Before the Announcement to 60 Days Later 
 
 
 
results for the complete sample of firms.  Figure 2 depicts the median cumulative 
abnormal return (outliers trimmed) for the same 60 day time period.  No trends are 
apparent for the medians of any of the sub-samples in the three months following the 
certification announcement, as the abnormal returns seem to fluctuate about zero.   
To perform a sensitivity analysis and to determine if the choice of model is 
driving the nature of the results, I also compute the buy-and-hold abnormal return 
BHARi(t1,t2) for the same 60 day period following the announcement. 
( ) ( ) ( )∏∏
==
+−+=
2
1
2
1
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iti rrttBHAR  (17) 
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where rit is the return for stock i on Day t and rct is the Day t return for the control stock 
identified for the Size and Industry Adjusted Model.  This quantity represents the 
abnormal percentage return on one dollar invested over the entire period of interest.  For 
the entire sample with outliers trimmed (N = 200), the mean (median) buy-and-hold 
abnormal return is 9.35% (2.41%).  The mean is marginally significant (two-tailed 
p = 0.06), while the median is insignificantly greater than zero (two-tailed p = 0.26).  
52.5% of the buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive, which is insignificantly 
different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.48).  For the sub-sample of large firms (N = 102), 
the mean (median) buy-and-hold abnormal return is –9.22% (0.21%), which is 
insignificantly different from zero (two-tailed p = 0.23 (0.60)).  Exactly 50% of the large 
firm buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive.  For the sub-sample of small firms with 
outliers trimmed (N = 98), the mean (median) buy-and-hold abnormal return is 3.98% 
(4.71%), which is insignificantly different from zero (two-tailed p = 0.61 (0.38)).  54.9% 
of the small firm buy-and-hold abnormal returns are positive, which is insignificantly 
different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.32).  For the trimmed sample of firms announcing 
certification to the 1994 standards (N = 151), the mean (median) buy-and-hold abnormal 
return for the entire sample of firms is 4.21% (3.20%), which is not significantly different 
from zero (two-tailed p = 0.26 (0.44)).  53.0% of the returns are positive, which is 
insignificantly different from 50% (two-tailed p = 0.46).  For the sub-sample of firms 
announcing certification to ISO 9001:2000 (N = 50), the mean (median) buy-and-hold 
abnormal return for the entire sample of firms is 23.91% (3.83%), which is insignificantly 
greater than zero (two-tailed p = 0.14 (0.34)).  Exactly 50% of the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for firms announcing certification to ISO 9001:2000 are positive. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Total Sample 
 When analyzing the complete sample of firms who had announced ISO 9000 
certification, there were few statistically significant results.  As shown in Table 3, only 
three out of the 45 tests were significant at α = 0.05.  Furthermore, there were 
significantly negative abnormal returns in only one out of these 45 tests (percentage of 
negative CAR(-1,0) from the Market Adjusted Model, p = 0.03).  Overall, these results 
suggest that the market does not exhibit a strong positive reaction to an ISO 9000 
certification announcement.  The market value of firms in general does not significantly 
change; hence, I am unable to reject the null of H1.   
 Analysis of the risk parameters of the complete sample of firms yielded similarly 
statistically insignificant results.  I was unable to detect any significant shifts (positive or 
negative) in equity beta, asset beta, debt leverage, equity variance, asset variance, or 
Market Model residuals.  Overall, ISO 9000 certification announcements are not 
associated with a change in the systematic risk of a firm or its asset variance; therefore, 
there was no observable significant change in idiosyncratic risk and I am unable to reject 
the null of H2.  Furthermore, there is scant evidence that certification announcements 
result in an exchange of wealth between bondholders and equityholders for the complete 
sample of firms. 
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Impact of Firm Size 
 There are statistically significant differences between large firms and small firms 
that announce ISO 9000 certification, particularly on the announcement date (Day 0).  
Both the mean and median large firm abnormal returns are significantly less than zero in 
all five models (p ≤ 0.03), and the small firm means are slightly and marginally positive.  
I observe similar results for the three primary models and the two models that adjust for 
size and industry effects, suggesting that the statistically more positive abnormal returns 
are not due to the “small firm effect” described by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981).  I 
also observe that large firms experience a significant decrease in asset variance after 
announcing ISO 9000 certification.  Therefore, the reduction in the market value of 
equity may be the result of a shift of wealth from equityholders to bondholders and the 
impact of ISO 9000 certification announcements on the overall market value of large 
firms is not as negative as the impact on the market value of equity.  I observe dissimilar 
behavior in small firms, for which ISO 9000 certification announcements lead to an 
insignificant increase in asset variance.  The overall change in the market value of small 
firms is likely larger than the change in the market value of equity as the wealth of both 
bondholders and equityholders increases slightly.  These results suggest that while the 
change in the overall market value of large firms might not be as negative as the change 
in the market value of equity, it is still less than the change in the overall market value of 
small firms. The results are similar to those reported by other researchers on the 
economic effects of quality awards and certifications (Docking & Dowen, 1999; 
Hendricks & Singhal, 1996).  I can assert that ISO 9000 certification announcements 
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result in a more positive change in market value for small firms than for large firms, 
allowing a rejection of the null of H3.   
 There are several possible reasons for the differences in market value with respect 
to firm size.  The media covers large firms more extensively than smaller firms, so the 
market may be able to better assess the quality practices of large firms.  Certification, 
then, conveys little new information to the market causing a tempered reassessment of the 
firm’s probability of implementing an effective quality program.  Also, because ISO 9000 
registration is usually site specific, announcing certification at just one site has the 
potential of affecting a greater proportion of a small firm’s operations than those of a 
larger firm (Corbett, et al., 2005).  For example, Citigroup appears four times in the 
sample because the company undertook an initiative in the late 1990s to get all of their 
call centers and data operation centers ISO 9002:1994 certified.  The four CAR(-1,0) 
returns range from -1.5% to -4% regardless of the model used to estimate the abnormal 
returns.   
 
Impact of Standard Stringency 
 Marginally statistically significant negative changes were observed in the market 
value of equity for firms announcing certification to ISO 9001:1994 (p ≤ 0.10), 
insignificant negative changes for firms announcing certification to ISO 9002:1994  
(p ≤ 0.16), and marginally significant positive changes for firms announcing ISO 
9001:2000 certification (p ≤ 0.10).  When I further divide the sample based on both the 
type of certification and firm size, I observe similar results.  This suggests that while firm 
size may moderate the extent of the impact of the announcement on market value, it does 
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not drive the results with regards to the type of certification.  My analysis suggests that 
the market reaction to ISO 9001:2000 announcements is more positive than the reaction 
to ISO 9001:1994 or ISO 9002:1994 announcements, allowing me to reject the null of 
H4.   
 The difference between the market perceptions of ISO 9001:2000 and the 1994 
standards could be the result of several factors.  The costs of certification could be lower 
for the newer standard due to fewer documentation requirements.  In the sample, at least 
10 of the 50 firms that announced ISO 9001:2000 certification had previously been 
certified to one of the 1994 standards.14  It is possible that these firms could have merely 
made minor modifications to their applications to the 1994 standard, thus drastically 
reducing the up-front certification costs and increasing the value of conformance quality 
(higher Vc).  In addition, the market may perceive the 2000 standard as more stringent 
than its 1994 predecessors.  ISO 9001:2000 eliminated ISO 9002 and 9003, and with it 
eliminated the possibility that a firm could obtain ISO certification without adhering to 
all 20 quality elements of ISO 9001:1994 (Cianfrani, et al, 2001).  Certification to the 
newer standard may be a stronger market signal of the probability that a firm’s quality 
program is effective (higher P2).  These results closely pattern Hendricks & Singhal 
(1996, 2001a), who report that firms that win quality awards from independent sources 
fare better financially than firms that win supplier quality awards.   
 The marginally positive results for ISO 9001:2000 announcements could signal to 
the market a higher likelihood of performance quality.  Because of the standards renewed 
focus on customer satisfaction and connections to the principles of TQM, the market may 
perceive ISO 9001:2000 as a possible order-winner rather than merely an order-qualifier 
                                                 
14 The certification history of 19 of the 50 ISO 9001:2000 registered firms was not available. 
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(Hill, 1993).  Because I observe a significant reduction in asset variance for large firms 
announcing ISO 9001:2000 certification, the overall impact on the market value of the 
firm could be greater than the marginally positive change in equity value due to a transfer 
of wealth from equityholders to bondholders (Black & Scholes, 1973; Galai & Masulis, 
1976).  These asset variance tests were performed to check for the impacts of a 
moderating variable: wealth shifts between equityholders and bondholders.  The results in 
this study suggest that effect may be present, and it is important that future research in 
this area also conduct the same checks. 
 On the other hand, the market does not seem to react much to ISO 9002:1994 
announcements, possibly because of the limited scope of the standard for only production 
and installation activities (Ragothaman & Korte, 1999).  Because the sample frame 
includes the time during which the 1994 standards were replaced, the significantly 
negative results I observe for ISO 9001:1994 are possibly due to a market perception that 
firms were rushing to meet the old standard before the new one took effect.  For example, 
Abaxis Corporation announced certification to ISO 9001:1994 on May 15, 2002 (exactly 
17 months after the release of ISO 9001:2000) and exhibited Day -1 and 0 cumulative 
abnormal returns ranging from -8.74% to -4.31% depending on the model that was used.  
Furthermore, this ISO 9000 certificate was the firm’s first.  The reduction in market value 
for ISO 9001:1994 firms during the time period from 1999 to 2002 could also signal that 
the market perceived the soon to be obsolete standard as yet another meaningless 
management activity that brought about further operational restrictions.  The market may 
not classify ISO 9001:1994 as even an order-qualifier, but rather a needless exercise in 
obtaining an unimportant sheet of paper.   
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Post-Announcement Stock Performance 
 I observe no apparent pattern in the median stock performance in the quarter after 
announcing an ISO 9000 certification for the complete sample of firms (two-tailed  
p = 0.20).  On the other hand, the data presented in Figure 1 suggests that a few small 
firms that announced certification to one of the 1994 standards might be driving the 
significant mean cumulative abnormal returns for the complete sample, even with the 
four outliers trimmed.  In fact, 17 small firms that announced ISO 9000:1994 certification 
exhibit a 60 day CAR of more than 50%, while none are below 50%.  Eleven of these 
seventeen firms are part of SIC Industry Groups 357, 366, 367, or 737, which consist of 
high-technology manufacturing or services including computers and telecommunications.  
Because the sample frame coincides with the technology market “bubble” of the late 
1990s, it is not surprising to see many high-performing companies in these industry 
sectors.  It is likely that such high abnormal long-term performance from these eleven 
companies could be the result of industry-wide market movements and not directly 
attributable to ISO 9000 certification.   
Furthermore, the mean and median buy-and-hold abnormal returns for all sub-
samples are not different from zero at α = 0.05, suggesting that the choice of the model 
has an impact on the significance of the results.  Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest that 
one-to-one matching to a control firm (like the method used to calculate buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns) may be better specified than models based on a market portfolio (like 
the Market Adjusted Model CAR) because the latter leads to the presence of cross-
sectional dependency and positively skewed abnormal returns.15  Due to possible 
                                                 
15
 Cross-sectional dependency arises in the Market Adjusted CARs because the model assumes that the 
systematic equity risk of the firm is constant and always equal to the market risk (βe = 1).  Positively 
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industry-wide market effects and potential model misspecification, it is not possible to 
definitively state that the fluctuation in stock price during the post-announcement period 
is directly attributable to an ISO 9000 certification announcement.  In this case, if there is 
any wealth effect associated with certification, the market captures most of the change 
close to the announcement itself. 
                                                                                                                                                 
skewed abnormal returns arise because the Market Adjusted CARs do not account for compounding, 
while the buy-and-hold abnormal returns do. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this thesis I have examined the abnormal stock market reaction for the dates 
surrounding an ISO 9000 certification announcement.  Based on a sample of 204 firms of 
various sizes and industries that announced ISO 9000 certification from 1999 to 2002, I 
find no evidence that the stock market has any significant positive reaction.  I also find 
that the announcement has little effect on the systematic risk or idiosyncratic risk of the 
firm, meaning future cash flows are not discounted at a different rate than before the 
announcement.  However, I do find that the market value of equity for larger firms 
decreases by about 0.7%.  While that decrease may be due in part to a shift in wealth 
from equityholders to bondholders, there is ample reason to suspect that financial 
justifications for the pursuance of ISO 9000 certification may be invalid.  For smaller 
firms, I find that the market value of equity increases marginally, and the market value of 
corporate debt may also increase.  This suggests that as firm size increases, managers 
may be less justified in using financial parameters to argue for pursuing quality 
certifications.   
The financial effects of ISO 9000 certification were also dependent on standard 
stringency.  For firms that announced certification to the 1994 series of standards, the 
market value of equity did not change much for ISO 9002 and decreased by about 0.7% 
for ISO 9001.  While that decrease could be due in part from a shift in wealth from 
equityholders to bondholders, there is ample reason to believe that the older series of 
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standards did not reap financial rewards for those firms that attained them.  For firms 
announcing ISO 9001:2000 certification, I find that the market value of equity increases 
despite a possible shift in wealth from equityholders to bondholders.  Operations 
managers, then, are proper in using financial arguments to justify pursuing ISO 9000 
certification.  Should ISO announce in the future that the organization would expand the 
scope of their quality standards, managers ought to wait until the more stringent standards 
are released rather than rushing to obtain certification to the older standards before they 
become obsolete.  These findings are summarized in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Financial Benefit of ISO 9000 Certification as a Function of Firm Size and 
Standard Stringency 
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In addition, I found evidence that small firms experienced an increase in the 
market value of equity in the calendar quarter following an announcement to the 1994 
standards.  However, it is not possible to attribute this performance solely to the 
certification announcement, as a large number of exceptionally well performing firms in 
this sub-sample are in the high technology sector.  The “tech bubble” of the late 1990s 
could be skewing these results to the right, leading to the conclusion that industry-wide 
market movements could be an extenuating factor.   
 A limitation of this study is that it provides only a lower bound on the total 
economic value of ISO 9000.  I examined only the impact of the actual attainment of the 
certificate on the market value of the firm’s equity.  It would be interesting to study the 
long-term financial impact of attaining ISO 9000 certification to determine the extent to 
which the market anticipates the certification and further reassesses the post-
announcement operating performance of the firm.  The methodology employed by 
Hendricks & Singhal (2001a, 2005) would be particularly helpful in this effort.  Future 
research should also explore if the results I observe for this sample of American firms 
also apply internationally, particularly in the rapidly expanding Asian economies.  
Subsequent studies could document the reasons for the shift in wealth from equityholders 
to bondholders, and why this pattern was observed for certain groups of firms but not for 
others.  Other research could explore the possibility of other as yet undetermined 
moderating variables, including firm reputation, market share, or company age.  The 
impact of a firm’s quality reputation on investors’ pre- and post-announcement 
evaluations of the probability of an effective quality program is worth particular 
investigation.  Additional avenues for future research stem from the conclusion that the 
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market perceives ISO 9001:2000 differently from its 1994 predecessors.  It would also be 
interesting to evaluate the financial and operating performance of firms that were once 
ISO 9001:1994 or ISO 9002:1994 registered but who choose not to upgrade to the new 
standard and let their certificate expire.  Corbett, et al. (2005) reported that ISO 
9000:1994 firms exhibited better financial performance than non-certified firms as 
measured by several accounting and operating ratios, but my results suggest that these 
internal production economics measures might not necessarily be perceived by a firm’s 
external stakeholders and incorporated as improvements in shareholder value.  Since the 
results suggest that as ISO 9001:2000 is associated with positive changes in a firm’s 
external market measurements, it would be of interest to examine if the standard has that 
same impact on internal measures of firm performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ANNOUNCEMENT EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
 
Each of the criteria listed below was used to exclude announcements from the study 
sample: 
 
1. Announcements not pertaining to the awarding of an ISO 9000 series certificate.  In 
particular, many firms state on all company announcements that they are ISO 9000 
certified.  Announcements pertaining to the awarding of only ISO 14000 series 
certificates were also eliminated. 
2. Announcements appearing in either non-daily or not real-time publications or any 
announcement for which there was a problem in pinpointing when the information 
contained within became public knowledge. 
3. Announcements for firms not publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), NASDAQ, or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) at the time of the 
registration. 
4. Announcements made at the same time as quarterly earnings reports because of the 
difficulty in separating the effects of the earnings news from the effects of the 
certification news (Bernard & Thomas, 1990).   
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5. Announcements made between September 10, 2001 and September 28, 2001, the time 
period during and immediately following the New York and Washington terrorist 
attacks and subsequent market closures.16 
6. Announcements for firms with insufficient stock information available through the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database complied by the University 
of Chicago either during the event period or during a 210-day estimation period both 
before and after the announcement. 
7. Repeat announcements on a later date in a different source about a firm receiving ISO 
9000 series certification. 
8. Announcements for firms with more than one published article in the Wall Street 
Journal in the period between 2 days before the announcement and 2 days after the 
announcement.  Only announcements in the Wall Street Journal were considered to 
contaminate the sample because the most significant events for publicly traded firms 
are likely to be reported there (Hendricks & Singhal, 1997).  I did not use subjective 
decisions to judge the importance of the articles. 
9. Announcements for firms whose total assets, total sales, and total liabilities were not 
available for the fiscal years preceding and succeeding the announcement through 
either the Compustat, Bloomberg, or Hoover’s databases or the firm’s SEC filings 
(10-K). 
                                                 
16 Hendricks and Singhal (1996) eliminate from their event study sample announcements made during the 
week of the October 1987 stock market crash.  While obviously that event is too early to have any effect 
on the announcements in this study, both the stock market crash and the terrorist attacks are events that 
had a dramatic impact on all publicly traded equities.  Rather than trying to account for the anomaly in 
our analysis, we simply remove the announcements from the sample.  Special thanks Vinod Singhal from 
Georgia Tech for his comments concerning this issue. 
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10. Announcements stating that the firm plans to receive certification but has not been 
registered. 
11. Announcements made before official certification has been granted.  In particular, a 
few firms announced that they had been recommended for certification by their 
auditor but that the registration would not be official until a later date.  To remove 
any ambiguities concerning specification of the event date, these announcements 
were eliminated from the sample. 
12. Announcements made after the certification was published in the CEEM Information 
Services (Quality Systems Update, 2004) quarterly database of ISO 9000 registered 
companies.  Announcements made on the news wires after this time are merely 
reporting news that has already been made public and disseminated throughout the 
market. 
13. Announcements that did not specify which classification of ISO certification 
(9001:1994, 9002:1994, 9003:1994, or 9001:2000) the firm had achieved.   
14. Announcements pertaining to firms for which no control firm could be identified.  
The control firm specification procedure is described in Chapter V.  
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